INTRODUCTION

Before talking my topic above I would like to start with a question, where are we now? According to international discourse we are in the globalization era. There are many definitions about globalization, but the essence of it is related to the economic capitalism. Anything will have meaning in society life if they can be felt directly and concrete as welfare, justice, the same rights, scientific development, democracy, freedom and so on. They are the labels used to signed this era. For the nation, as Indonesia, that has not been ready to respond it the impact is the appearance of anything new that is never predicted before, including the problems dealing with socio-cultural and new religion interpretations.

Globalization deals with many life aspects and we can not stop it nor can we avoid it. We are now becoming part of the globalization itself. If the globalization impacts occure to the social, culture, and politics aspects that drive to the social change it is quite common, but if it causes the appearance and development of new Islamic mainstreams as the way to respond to it, it will be considered as problems that should be studied seriously. This situation has attracted numerous attention to discuss it academically especially on possible social conflict cased by the growing of some Islamic mainstreams such as al-Qiyadah, al-Qur'an Suci, Hidup dibalik Hidup, Lia Eden, JIL, Inkarus sunnah, Isa Bugis, Ahmadiyah, and so on.
ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS AS A RESPONSE OF GLOBALIZATION

There are new mainstreams of Islam revitalization movements now in Indonesia aims to respond the globalization and modern life. In case of Indonesian muslims, religious movement aims are not only to correct internal Islamic interpretations but also to the external that is government policy related to religion. It is considered that the portion of state authority in handling of religion affairs is too much. From this many Islamic movements the majority of them occur among muslim students and Muslim society in Indonesia.

The Action Unit Indonesian Muslim Students (KAMMI) and the Justice Party (recognized as the Justice and Welfare Party in April 2003), both founded in 1998 have their origin in the *da'wah* (propagation) movement on campus. The *da'wah* campus originated in the early 1070s at the Salman Mosque of the Bandung Institute of Technology but did not spread substantially until the crackdown on the political students movement that had resisted Suharto’s re-election in 1978. This time Islamism provided the alternative activity to political movement. Without a doubt, their religious cause was first encouraged by the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and later, by intensifying propagation from the Middle East and, especially from Saudi Arabia, seeking to counter the Shiah influence. Indonesia thus became involved both in global Islamic surge and in contests between various international Islamic groups.

The students movement critize in 1998 in many campuses in Indonesia sponsored by Amin Rais and finally becoming national power to insist Suharto leaves his position as a president. This movement rises new era, reformation. From this, since 1998s after New Order the discourse of civil society become a very popular in Indonesia.

Civil society has become once more an attractive field of study among political theorists. Even civil society is often in opposition to state power and political society, the key role of the state in putting into effect what has been achieved in civil society and in protecting basic rights and liberties of individual members cannot be ignored. Without the power of state, civil society has the potential to degenerate into a sphere of civil warfare over ethnic, religious, and class-based issues. It is important to stress that civil society cannot be a substitute for government (Norton, 1993). While untamed state power stands in the way of a democratic society, limited state power is *sine quanon* for a democratic order.
CIVIL SOCIETY IN THEORY
Today, the term civil society still continues to embody anti-state connotations. There is a tendency, especially in Turkey, to confuse nongovernmental aspects of the concept with anti-statism. During the anti-communist opposition in Eastern Europe in the 1980s, civil society as a slogan emphasized its autonomy from the state (Kadioglu, 2005). The revival of the concept in such a context formulated civil society and state as mutually exclusive phenomena. Jean Cohen and Andrew Arato in their groundbreaking work Civil Society and Political Theory propose a three-part model which differentiates between civil society, the state, and the economy. In their formulation, civil society is defined as the "sphere of social interaction between economy and state, composed above all of the intimate sphere (especially the family), the sphere of associations (especially voluntary associations), social movements, and forms of public communication (Cohen and Arato, 1992).

On the other hand, in this tripartite model the sphere of civil society does not comprise all social life outside of the state and the economy. Cohen also distinguishes political and economic societies from civil society in the sense that political society encapsulates political parties, parliaments, and political organizations and mediates between the state and civil society; and economic society is composed of the organizations of production, distribution, firms, cooperatives, and institutions of bargaining such as unions and councils and has the mediating role between civil society and the economy. What distinguishes the actors of political and economic societies is that they are after state power and economic production respectively. On the other hand, the political role of the actors in civil society is limited to the politics of identity, influence, inclusion, and reform (Cohen, 1995).

The movement flourishing in civil society bring the discussion of new issues into the public sphere. They work for the expansion of rights, for the defense of the autonomy of civil society and for its further democratization. And they cannot try to replace the institutions of representative democracy (Cohen and Arato, 1992). As Norton argues, " Civility may be learned in the school of society, but the lesson soon may be forgotten without an enforcing authority," (Norton, 1993).

Following the three-part model of Cohen and Arato, Habermas points to the limited scope of action of civil society:

Civil society can directly transform itself, and it can have at most an indirect effect on the self-transformation of the political system;
generally, it has an influence only on the personnel and programming of this system. But in no way does it occupy the position of a macrosubject supposed to bring society as a whole under control and simultaneously act for it (Habermas, 1996).

In this structure, the connection of civil society to political society is essential. While civil society must be eager to inform and influence political society, the latter must be open to the influence of the former. In other words, as much as civil society should respect the decision making power of political society, the latter should do so by being open to the information and feedback that it gets from the former. It is under this mutual relationship that civil society fulfills its role in the process of modernization.

According to Erness Gellner among the major world civilizations and religions Islam is unique in terms of its immunity to secularization. Moreover, he claims that Islam "exemplifies as a social order which seems to lack much capacity to provide political countervailing institutions or associations, which is atomized without much individualism, and which operates effectively without intellectual pluralism (Gellner, 1994).

Political Islam (Islamism), in various forms, is the most rapidly growing and persuasive ideology among Muslims today. Islamism is a socio-political ideology which strives to institute governments under Allah's authority, not man-made constitutions, and administration of society according to sharia (Islamic law), not Western law. The ideology of Islamism is the cutting edge of Islamic militants' exertions against the West and its global system. As an ideology, Islamism is distinct from the religion of Islam, although it draws strength from zealous members of the Islamic resurgence. The Islamic resurgence does not protest against Islamic institutions, but rather, protests against secular government and social innovations modeled on the West. Understanding the Islamists' critique of modern life provides some clarity to these distinctions. Most Islamists (except for retrograde Salafists), are not against modern instrumentalities produced by industries (telephones, cars, airplanes, computers, etc). Rather, Islamists are opposed to modernism, a sequel to industrialization and modernization, which is the ideology of social innovation in a secular environment completely unhinged from traditional and religious norms.

The Islamists' slogan, "Islam is the solution" (popularized by the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb), will continue to inspire political exertions against Western-type governments in Islamic countries, until or unless the West convinces the Islamic
world that it can have an equitable stake in globalization. Islamists will resist cultural and political influences of the West's system, even if they acquiesce to economic interaction and trade. Their resistance to the West is not to imply mainly overt clashes. Most clashes for the proximate future will occur within the Islamic world itself, just as industrial countries of the West's global system will have their own internal (especially social) problems (Harvey, Sullivan and Groves, 2005).

In this following sections, I will look at how these delicate relationship developed in Indonesia by seeing some Islamic movements. Many Islamic mainstreams and movements but I only want to take two Islamic movements, Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) and Justice and Welfare Party (PKS).

HT is an elitist movement that operates as a self-declared political Party grounded in radical Islamist ideology while using theology to justify its position. According to Abdullah Robin, a London-based HT leader, HT is "the only political party wanting to unite the "ummah", as opposed to merely uniting the Muslims of a single nation-state, a political unit that HT believes to be anathema to Islam. HT therefore faces the challenge of uniting the multitude of diverse Muslim groups, each following different interpretations of Islam with the appeal of its own ideology. Being a pragmatic political movement, HT is prepared to accommodate other interpretations of Islam to reach its goal (Harvey, Sullivan and Groves, 2005).

HT correctly identifies itself as truly modern Islamic movement. Although HT's philosophy is not compatible with Western notions of modernity, unlike Wahhabism it pursues its objective through modern methods. HT's propaganda machine reaches its prospective constituency through the party's print media circulations, the Internet and personal recruitment. There are at least seven websites that are related directly to Hizb ut-Tahrir. One of these websites is devoted exclusively to interaction with the mass media (Harvey, Sullivan and Groves, 2005).

Ultimately, the challenge facing HT is creating a new world order. HT has provided Muslims with a compelling, satisfying explanation of why the Islamic world fell behind the West. In HT's view, the only way to close the gap is to destroy the existing order. HT thus viciously opposes the current American-led international system and fundamentally disagrees with Francis Fukuyama, who claimed that, due to the defeat of Nazi and communist threats to democracy and capitalism, the "End of History" had arrived. The spokesman of HT Dr.
Imran Wahid, recently stated that "Fukuyama says we have reached the end of history because there's a lack of a viable alternative ideology to capitalism and western civilization (Baran, 2004). We view our work as a direct challenge to that statement" we have to prove him wrong".

HT believes that democracy eventually will be replaced by an Islamic order. In HT’s view, the US is waging a war on Islam precisely because it fears its ultimate eclipse by a united Islamic world. To promote this view and to gain support, HT uses a mixture of communist methodology, Wahhabi theology and fascist rhetoric. Unlike other radical Islamist movements, who fight against the militaries in Muslim states, HT brings these forces to its side by infiltrating the security service with a radical political interpretation of Islam (Baran, 2004). HT also operates in several other pivotal countries, and almost every head of a Muslim state considers the movement to be a serious national security threat. As the International Crisis Group has noted, HT was introduced in Indonesia in 1983 by Abdur-Rahman al-Baghdadi, of Jordanian-Lebanese descent. It is led by Ismail Yusanto, who became a member in 1985 while he was a geology student at one of Indonesia’s leading institutions, the Gajah Mada University Yogyakarta. What started as an underground campus movement today remains largely campus based and enjoys well-attended rallies and meetings without government restrictions. This is despite the fact that it may have ties to violent extremist groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah, the group responsible for the Bali Bombing in October 2002.

With its rich and tolerant Islamic traditions, Indonesia is the best region to begin the battle for ideas in this existential struggle. It is also the primary target for HT. In waging ideological war, the US needs to highlight the importance of internal reform in the context of national security. Indonesia government cannot win the fight against radicalism unless there is a change in the political and economic conditions that have created a ripe environment for the acceptance of radical ideas. Democratic and economic reforms are therefore essential for long-term stability, since people with no opportunity to participate in civic file or to practice their religion openly and freely will go underground. Ultimately, as Abduvahitov notes, "If fifty years from today we win today we win this battle, it will be mainly thanks to good governance taking place in the Muslim world.

In battle against HT in Asia, including Indonesia, the West should focus primarily on improving socio-economic conditions, so that people can see the benefits
of democratic capitalism and become less tempted to oppose it. It is the economic realm that Western political and intellectual capital is best spent. Since HT rejects the democratic process, Western efforts to engage the organization are pointless. By so intently focusing on democracy, the West is wasting valuable political capital and losing credibility with Asian governments without addressing HT's fundamental arguments. The group has no desire to become part of something that it opposes and plans eventually to destroy (Baran, 2004).

Second, the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS) tends to be regarded a more moderate and democratic than other parties in the political domain simply because their demonstration though "radical criticizing the American position towards Muslims, are always carried out very peacefully. Above, all, however the justice party propagates a Islamist political ideology that attempts to re-establish Islamic civilization and to place Islam at the centre of the political order. The manifesto of the Justice and Welfare Party says, "Allah who has supreme power wished human beings to play a role as representatives of God or the Caliph. It depends on how far human beings are responsible to function (as caliph) consistently. The universal value of democracy is people's interpretation of the responsibility (caliph). Such an understanding of democracy is not far removed from that of so-called "militants" or "fundamentalists", who may deem the justice Party to be "radical" enough in terms of political thought, but too moderate in its methods. Not only, therefore, should we carefully examine the interaction between thought and actions of specific 'moderate' groups, we also need to draw the complete map of social and political movements in order to understand so-called militants (Miichi, 2003).

**CONCLUSION**

We can not build the ideal state not to mention Islamic state if we cannot empower and share the two important roles in the state that is civil society and state itself. We have to solve our Islamic internal problems that the concept of Islamic civil society in some aspects is different from the concept of civil society on West views. So the Islamic slogan "Islam is rahmatan lil alamin" for muslims life is not a state of being but more a state of becoming for the Islamic society because it needs to be materialized real in economics, culture, social, and politics of muslim life.
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