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Indonesian Defence Diplomacy: France as A Partner in Military Defence Revitalization during 2019-2023

Yesi Riana Yusnita Sari

Universitas Kristen Indonesia

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E-mail address: yesiriana11@gmail.com

Abstract

Having a strategic location between two continents (Asia and Australia) and two oceans (the Pacific and the Indian) gives Indonesia the benefit of becoming a leading actor in the region, especially within the ASEAN. However, this geographical location also poses potential threats for Indonesia, both traditional and non-traditional threats. This situation is made worse by the tension between two great powers in the Indo-Pacific: China and the US. Indonesia then needs to have a good military endurance capability, and even though the Indonesian Armed Forces' personnel is not lacking, the total number of Indonesia's military equipment is somewhat lacking. Understanding the challenge, Indonesia has been trying to modernize its weapon system by conducting military diplomacy to obtain the best cooperation in weapon system. Therefore, this paper will analyze Indonesia's effort in defense diplomacy within the period of 2019 - 2023 and how France becomes a partner in the defense sector, by using the Military Diplomacy Approach, as well as analyzing the benefits and challenges of every step that has been taken so far.

Keywords: Defense, Indonesia, Military Diplomacy

Introduction

Geographically, Indonesia is strategically located between two continents (Asia and Australia) and two oceans (the Pacific and the Indian Ocean). Even before the founding of the the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), Indonesia's location has made it a strategic location for conducting trade and economic cooperation. In terms of international relations, Indonesia has the potential to become a middle power, which would make it a significant player in the region, particularly in ASEAN (Abbondanza, 2022). The major powers have always paid close attention to Indonesia's political direction, particularly during the Cold War. To acquire influence, both the United States and the Soviet Union paid special attention to Indonesia. This eventually became the vanguard of the Non-Aligned movement, which Indonesia embraced, and prompted a free-active policy. This means that Indonesia is free to determine its political direction without being part of any bloc, while remaining active and not passive in international political affairs.

The conclusion of the Cold War does not signify the end of Indonesia's international political trials. Regional conflicts such as the South China Sea Conflict, which is so near to Indonesia's own region and involves ASEAN member states, are manifestations of rivalries that intersect with Southeast Asia. Approximately 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic metres of gas are estimated to exist in the South China Sea region (CSIS, 2022). This results in conflicts between several nations in the region, including the Philippines and China. In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled on claims brought against China by the Philippines under UNCLOS, granting virtually all of the Philippines' claims. Even though



China signed the agreement that established the tribunals, it refuses to recognise their authority (CFR, 2022). As a form of resistance, China initiated the intensive construction of artificial islands and military facilities in the South China Sea. In addition to constructing artificial islands, China is also constructing military bases on the disputed Paracel, Spratley, and Woody Islands. There, China deployed fighter aircraft, cruise missiles, and radar systems (CFR, 2022). Indonesia cannot be detached from China's territorial disputes. Indonesia, a maritime nation situated between the Pacific and Indian oceans, shares a border junction with China in North Natuna. According to UNCLOS, this area is included in Indonesia's EEZ, and Indonesia is presently investigating the possibility of oil and gas drilling in this area. Referring to the nine-dash line claim, China asserts the area as its territory and opposes Indonesia's exploration (Steffens, 2013, p. 93). The drilling in the Natuna Islands was also contested in a letter sent by China to Indonesia (Reuters, 2021). In this area guarded by Chinese frigates, Chinese fishing vessels are frequently found engaging in illegal fishing (CNN Indonesia, 2020).

In addition, the region that became known as the Indo-Pacific has recently emerged as a prima donna region, attracting various world powers that are competing to become the dominant actor in the region. Obviously, the United States and China are the most well-known actors in the struggle for influence and power in the Indo-Pacific. The United States continues to strengthen its military diplomacy in the Indo-Pacific region by bolstering its military cooperation with regional nations. China is also aggressively constructing military bases in foreign countries and artificial islands. Also participating was Japan, which subsequently invited the United States, India, and Australia to participate in QUAD, a joint training programme. As a country whose Exclusive Economic Zone is located in the Indo-Pacific, France has participated actively in diplomatic and military efforts to acquire influence in the region for many years. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States formed the AUKUS collaboration last year, which strained diplomatic relations between France and the three countries to the point where France withdrew its ambassador from Washington and Canberra as a protest (The Guardian, 2021). Indonesia's lengthy history of rowing between two rocks has taught us that it must take strategic and cautious steps in order to avoid being swept away by geopolitical conflicts.

As explained in the preceding paragraph, the complexity of the geopolitical problems encircling Indonesia is apparent. In addition to geopolitical issues like the South China Sea, Indonesia confronts potential non-traditional threats that pose a unique challenge to its security and resilience. As a country with so many races, ethnicities, and religions, Indonesia is a wealthy nation, but also prone to division. In Indonesia, identity-based radical movements are common, ranging from the Free Aceh Movement, which demands the liberation of Aceh for the establishment of an Islamic state, to terrorist organisations like Jemaah Islamiyah. In addition to terrorism, Indonesia confronts threats from piracy, fish theft, human trafficking, and the discovery of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV) in Indonesian waters (The Guardian, 2020, paragraph 1). These non-traditional hazards are most prevalent in Indonesian waters, and as an archipelagic nation, Indonesia has a vast area to patrol and supervise.

Clearly, Indonesia faces numerous obstacles in safeguarding its sovereign territory from existing threats. The strategic location of Indonesia can be a double-edged sword. This, on the one hand, makes Indonesia a strategic location as a trade centre and also gives it the potential to become a middle-power nation. However, if Indonesia does not act with caution, this



situation could become a separate issue for Indonesia. Consequently, Indonesia's military resilience is one of the most important factors it needs to face the current situation. Despite the absence of mandatory military service in Indonesia, the number of citizens interested in joining the Indonesian National Armed Forces has not diminished. Indonesia has 395,500 active personnel as of 2021, making it one of the 10 countries in Asia with the highest number of active military members (IISS, 2021). However, the condition of the Main Tool System of the Indonesian Armed Forces (ALUTSISTA) is quite the opposite. Indonesia's military apparatus is still in insufficient condition to effectively combat the threats it faces. This is also evidenced by the absence of a military budget and an assessment of the urgency of modernising and expanding Indonesia's military arsenal. In 2019, President Joko Widodo appointed Lieutenant General TNI (Purn) H. Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo, also known as Prabowo Subianto, as Minister of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia in the Advanced Indonesia Cabinet. For the sake of Indonesia's resiliency and security, the new Minister of Defence made immediate efforts to enhance the weapons system and also made diplomatic efforts with other nations in order to acquire weapons acquisition partners.

After the establishment of AUKUS, the development of defence diplomacy relations between Indonesia and France is of particular interest to the author. Although France and Indonesia have collaborated on defence since 1950, the focus of this collaboration has been on training and command instruction for officers, rather than on weapon systems. When France approved the sale of Rafale fighter aircraft to Indonesia, the situation changed. With the presence of the new Minister of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia, this journal will examine Indonesia's efforts to increase its military resilience, particularly in the field of ALUTSISTA modernization, and how France emerged as Indonesia's defence revitalization partner, despite the fact that the United States has always been Indonesia's primary ally. within the domain of defence. This journal will be published between 2019 and 2023.

Research Method

This paper's theoretical framework is using Defensive Realism Theory. According to Kenneth Waltz's Theory of International Politics (1979), the structure of the international system is anarchic, meaning that there is no entity above sovereign states. This circumstance compels the state to always defend itself against prospective threats, particularly those that threaten state sovereignty. The state is not always an aggressive actor that uses its military power to conquer other countries' territory; rather, the state uses military factors to defend itself in an anarchic international system.

Military Diplomacy is the concept used as a point of analysis. Diplomacy is frequently interpreted as the art of negotiating in the form of soft power to attain an objective. While the military is typically viewed as the state's use of coercive force to accomplish its objectives, this is not always the case. However, military diplomacy is not about physical power; it focuses on bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the military and defence sectors. In this instance, the element that cooperates the most is the military, specifically the Minister of Defence and a military institution of a country, which in the case of Indonesia is the Indonesian National Armed Forces. Diplomacy is typically a part of an ambassador's responsibilities, but the number and scope of actors participating in diplomacy are expanding and diversifying, including state government agencies such as the state military (Swistek, 2012).




The relationship between military diplomacy or defence diplomacy and military officials is intimate. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the function of the military institution shifted from one of hard power and espionage to one of diplomacy in order to achieve state interests. In essence, being an instrument of a nation's foreign policy. The state employs military or defence diplomacy as a strategy to bolster its military strength through cooperation in the development of weapons systems and/or personnel capacity development. This is consistent with defensive realism, which emphasises defence over offence.

Discussion

Indonesian Efforts in Defense/Military Diplomacy

According to data compiled by The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS, 2021, p. 218), Indonesia ranks among the top 10 countries in Asia with the highest number of military personnel in 2021. This is based on the condition of the country's military personnel, which has been described as quite advantageous. Personnel alone is obviously insufficient to construct a strong defence system. This must be controlled with personnel and weapon systems that are also quite effective. Unfortunately, Indonesia's defence is not optimally defended by its current weaponry. The Minimum Essential Force policy, which was established in 2007 in the form of 3 Strategic Plans or Strategic Plans (strength, distribution of deployment, and capabilities) and 3 stages of implementation: 2010-2014, 2015-2019, and 2020-2024 was the result of efforts to revitalise Indonesia's defence system.

The objective of this policy is to revive not only through the acquisition of weapons, but also through initiatives to develop the Indonesian weapons and security equipment industry, such as through the transfer of knowledge and technology. This is done so that, in the future, Indonesia will be able to produce its own defence equipment and will no longer be dependent on the production of weapons systems by foreign countries. In spite of this, the procurement of weapons is still a component of the current plan to revitalise Indonesia's defence system. This effort is not intended to promote an arms race in the region, but rather to attain professional standards in line with Indonesia's vision and mission, Nawacita and the Global Maritime Fulcrum (Ministry of Defence RI, 2015).



Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies



Under Prabowo's stewardship, the Indonesian Ministry of Defence began conducting diplomacy with other countries in order to achieve the Minimum Basic Strength. This also pertains to initiatives to strengthen Indonesia's defence. Until the middle of 2019, Prabowo held bilateral meetings with eight distinct countries (Rizani, 2020). In addition, Indonesia participated in the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) on 16 November 2019 in Bangkok, Thailand. The Indonesian Minister of Defence emphasised the need to strengthen ASEAN and the significance of attaining regional defence autonomy on this occasion. Additionally, he emphasised the significance of security in the Indo-Pacific (Rizani, 2020, p. Indonesia held bilateral encounters with several nations, including Malaysia and Thailand, on the sidelines of the conference. Indo-Pacific issues were also discussed during Prabowo's meeting with the US Defence Minister, during which Indonesia emphasised the need for joint military training and the sending of soldiers to the United States for military education. All of this demonstrates that Indonesia is cognizant of its position in the region; consequently, it is essential for the nation to have robust military capabilities.

To accomplish this Minimum Basic Strength, it is not only a matter of bolstering diplomacy, but also of acquiring the primary defence system tools and advancing the Indonesian Defence Industry through meetings with foreign nations. Indonesia's incessant visits to nations that manufacture weapons equipment enabled it to accomplish this goal. Indonesia has visited Turkey five times by June 2021, and Russia three times. Indonesia's potential acquisition of fighter aircraft, in this instance a Sukhoi manufactured in Russia, was one of the objectives of the visit (Tempo, 2021). In addition to Turkey and Russia, Indonesia also conducted defence diplomacy with the United States, as evidenced by Prabowo's visit to the Pentagon in October 2020, which was followed by a reciprocal visit by Acting Secretary of Defence Christopher Miller in December 2020. This diplomacy with the United States produced indications that the U.S. would sanction the sale of F-15 and F-18 fighter aircraft to Indonesia. The United States rejected Indonesia's proposal to acquire Lockheed Martin's F-35 aircraft on the grounds that it would take too long (Strangio, 2020). Indonesia then retained the US law firm Ott, Bielitzki & O'Neill to continue acquiring firearms from the United States (Pecquet, 2021).

Indonesia also engages in defence diplomacy with Germany and France, both of which have robust armaments industries and even a joint defence industry through Airbus Defence (The Jakarta Post, 2022). Indonesia has previously purchased arms from Germany, including eight Leopard 2A4 third-generation main battle tanks and submarines. This visit to France resulted in the signing of a Defence Cooperation Agreement, which will serve as a benchmark for Indonesia and France's future defence diplomacy relations. The objectives of this agreement are military education and training, maritime security, the eradication of terrorism, and the development of the defence industrial sector so that it can become a part of the global defence equipment production chain (Kemlu RI, 2020).

Free and active politics are exemplified by Indonesian diplomacy that is not focused on a particular coalition and tends to conduct diplomacy with all countries from different blocs, such as the United States and Russia, which are in opposition. Nonetheless, this is also an indication that Indonesia is intensifying its efforts to convince weapon-producing nations to release their weapons to Indonesia. Indonesia's defence diplomacy is a strategic move aimed at securing the most profitable weapons acquisition agreement.



French Diplomacy in Indo-Pacific Regions

France places a high priority on the Indo-Pacific region. This statement can be found on the official website of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which states that the Indo-Pacific is a top priority for France and is also included in the 2017 French Defence and National Security Strategic Review. This is because France has islands in the region, including Mayotte Island and La Réunion, as well as other Pacific island regions. Approximately 1.5 million French citizens and 8,000 French military are stationed in this region, which comprises 93% of the total area of the French Exclusive Economic Zone. Even from an economic standpoint, France recognises the significance of this region, given that there are six G20 members in the region, namely Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, and South Korea. Trade routes also made the Indo-Pacific region a concern for France, as the region's rapid economic growth made it significant in terms of globalisation (Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs).




Source: France Ministry of Defence (Ministère des Armées)

The existence of China with its Silk Road initiative (Belt and Road Initiative) and territorial disputes resulting from the 9-dash line claim encourage France to participate in this region in order to promote a stable multipolar order based on the rule of law and free movement, as well as fair and effective multilateralism. During his visit to the Naval Base on Garden Island in Sydney, Australia, on 2 May 2018, French President Emmanuel Macron outlined France's Indo-Pacific strategy, in which France seeks to be an inclusive actor and a sustaining mediation force, as outlined in seven strategic pillars. This strategy makes plain France's desire to become the hegemon in the Indo-Pacific region, which includes the desire to participate in the ADMM+ framework (Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, 2022). France also conducts bilateral and multilateral military exercises, such as Varuna and Garuda with India (Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires Etrangères, 2022).

As previously explained, the Indo-Pacific region is a significant territory for France, as 93% of its EEZ is located there. France deploys its military forces in the Indo-Pacific region in order to fulfil its ambition to become the region's hegemon. France's permanent force in the region consists of 7,000 personnel, of which 4,100 are in the Indian Ocean and 2,900 are in the Pacific Ocean (France MoD, 2019). These soldiers are responsible for the security of French territory and the surveillance of France's EEZ. French forces are permanently stationed in the United



Arab Emirates and Djibouti, equipped with six Rafales in the UAE and four Mirage-2000s in Djibouti, as well as eight helicopters and one tactical transport aircraft. The French Armed Forces (FAZSOI) are divided between the islands of La Réunion and Mayotte in the southern Indian Ocean using 2 reconnaissance frigates, each equipped with 1 helicopter, 1 supply and support ship, 2 patrol boats (including 1 polar patrol boat), and 2 tactical transport aircraft. In the Pacific Ocean, the French Armed Forces are headquartered in New Caledonia and French Polynesia and operate two reconnaissance frigates, each fitted with one helicopter, three patrol boats, two multi-mission vessels, five maritime reconnaissance aircraft, four tactical transport aircraft, and five helicopters.



Source: France Ministry of Defence (Ministère des Armées)

Furthermore, France engages in diplomacy with countries in this region, particularly in the realm of defence. Despite the fact that France and Indonesia have a Defence Cooperation Agreement due to Indonesia's military diplomacy, Indonesia was not a priority country for France at the time. Australia has become the country of preference for France. In 2016, Naval Group, which is partially owned by France, initiated discussions with the Australian Department of Defence regarding the development of a diesel-electric attack class submarine for a total cost of USD 35 billion. This agreement was subsequently signed in 2018 (Gady, 2019). This type of submarine is the Shortfin Barracuda Block 1A Submarines, of which 12 will be constructed in Adelaide, Australia by the Australia Submarine Corporation. The two nations then discussed the possibility of French warships gaining access to Australian military bases (Galloway, 2021).

These facts demonstrate that Australia is the focus of French military diplomacy, as France attempts to exert influence in a region that is presently of concern to many nations. However, this French effort did not produce the anticipated results. An incident altered the direction of French diplomatic strategy in this region.

AUKUS: France's pivot to Indonesia.

A trilateral security treaty between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS) was announced on September 15, 2021. At the time of the AUKUS announcement,



the Australian Prime Minister at the time, Scott Morrison, stated that AUKUS was a collaboration between technology, scientists, industry, and the defence sectors of the three countries to build a safer region, which benefited each party. (White House, 2021). This security agreement includes quantum technology and cyber security development. AUKUS also includes the development of nuclear-powered submarines for Australia, using technology from the United States and the United Kingdom. This is a historic agreement, given that the two countries have never wanted to share nuclear-powered submarine technology with other nations and have even denied a similar request from India, citing national security concerns. Surprisingly, however, the technology will be shared with Australia for the development of Australian submarines.

Australia unilaterally cancelled the development of submarines with the Naval Group, which infuriated France. France felt they were never invited to discuss AUKUS and the possibility of rescinding the agreement, instead confessing that they learned about it through the broadcasts of the three AUKUS nations. France recalled its ambassadors in Washington and Canberra as a form of protest on September 17, 2021, or two days after the AUKUS announcement (The New York Times, 2021). In the entire history of diplomatic relations between France, the United States, and Australia, France has never taken this action, which demonstrates how dissatisfied France is with this security pact. This is further supported by France's intention to become the hegemon in the Indo-Pacific and the fact that it already has an agreement with Australia, despite not being invited to join the accord. Even the French foreign minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, referred to this as a treachery or "backstab" for France.

Despite setbacks in defence cooperation with Australia, France remains committed to maintaining a presence in the Indo-Pacific region. Following the termination of the contract with the Naval Group, France initiated diplomatic relations with other nations in the region. This initiative is also the most fruitful in terms of defence diplomacy with Indonesia. In addition to its status as a middle power in this region, Indonesia has repeatedly approached France in an effort to acquire fighter aircraft jointly. Indonesia is also interested in increasing the number of its littoral submarines, making it an attractive partner for France after the cessation of its contract with Australia (France 24, 2021).

In November 2021, Le Drian visited Indonesia as part of his diplomatic duties. He emphasised the significance of a free and stable Indo-Pacific region in his discussions with CSIS Indonesia (CSIS Indonesia, 2021). This action follows Indonesia's military diplomacy, in which, in June 2021, Indonesia signed an agreement (letter of intent) to acquire 36 Rafale fighter aircraft from Dassault Aviation France (Irish, 2022). Since AUKUS, French diplomatic efforts in Indonesia have increased significantly, which Indonesia has welcomed. The intensity of diplomacy between the two nations included a visit by the Indonesian Minister of Defence to the Élysée Palace and a meeting with President Émmanuel Macron, as well as a visit by the Indonesian Minister of Defence to the French Ministry of Defence and a meeting with the French Minister of Defence at the time, Florence Parly. In contrast, France has visited Indonesia frequently since the establishment of AUKUS.

These facts demonstrate that Australia is the focus of French military diplomacy, as France attempts to exert influence in a region that is presently of concern to many nations. However, this French effort did not produce the anticipated results. An incident altered the direction of French diplomatic strategy in this region.



Indonesia ultimately acquired 6 (six) units of Rafale F-4 fighter aircraft on February 11, 2022 (RFI, 2022), which are 4.5 generation fighter aircraft, bringing the total number of fighter aircraft acquired by Indonesia to 42 units. The acquisition agreement was signed in Indonesia during the visit of Defence Minister Florence Parly. If these 42 units are successfully acquired by Indonesia, the number of TNI AU ALUTSISTA will be dominated by French fighter aircraft, given that the number of F-16 Fighting Falcons from the United States is only 25 units, then the Sukhoi from Russia Su-27 totals 5 units and the Sukhoi Su-27 Su-27. -30 totals 11 units, for a total of 39 multirole fighters (WDMMA, 2022). It is evident that the procurement of 42 Rafales will surpass Indonesia's total number of combat aircraft. Obviously, this is a significant issue for both France and Indonesia. During this visit in February 2022, the two countries agreed not only on the acquisition of combat aircraft, but also a cooperation agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) on research and development in the defence sector between PT PAL and the Naval Group regarding submarines, cooperation in offset and ToT programmes between Dassault Aviation and PT Indonesian Aerospace, cooperation in the field of telecommunications between PT LEN and Thales Group, and cooperation in the field of information tec This is a very significant matter between Indonesia and France, as defence cooperation on this magnitude has never occurred before. This cooperation will be mutually beneficial to both countries.

The defence pact between Indonesia and France also raises an issue that merits consideration. When the acquisition of these six Rafale units was disclosed to the media, the United States shortly thereafter announced that the US Senate had approved the sale of Boeing F-15 fighter jets (The Jakarta Post, 2022). Due to Indonesia's strategic position and potential to become a middle power in the region, particularly in ASEAN, this indicates that the United States does not want its military diplomatic power position to be usurped by France.

Diversification: Perspectives on Technological Obstacles

When China imposed economic sanctions on South Korea in 2017 for the launch of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) defence system by the United States on South Korean territory, South Korea began to implement diversification-based policies to reduce its reliance on a single country. These policies are now known as the New Southern Policy or NSP (Wongi, 2021). After Russia's attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the diversification policy has been strengthened once more, this time in terms of energy security, particularly gas supply (European Parliament, 2022). Diversification is also the theme of Indonesia's defence strategy. In addition to being a component of the implementation of free-active politics, this prevents Indonesia from becoming overly dependent on a single nation, bearing in mind that Indonesia was once subject to an embargo by the United States over the East Timor conflict. The steps taken by Indonesia, such as efforts to modernise this weapon system and diversification, are a means for Indonesia to strengthen its military defence, whose purpose is self-defense and not attack, according to the theory of defensive realism.

As a proponent of free and active politics, Indonesia is not tied to any one nation in terms of military and economic cooperation. There have been no demands from any party, including China, to restrict Indonesia's economic and military cooperation partners. Diversification is an advantage for Indonesia in terms of its cooperation strategy, and it also has the potential to continue to intensify military diplomacy on the path to peace with other nations. Indonesia's



efforts to engage in military diplomacy with multiple nations were successful in attracting France as a partner in reviving its military resilience, which was also facilitated by AUKUS. However, diversification presents its own unique challenges.

Weapons-related issues are sensitive because they involve a nation's ability to withstand prospective attacks from other nations or the ability of other nations to produce far more sophisticated weapons than their own. The most egregious instance is the United States Senate's prohibition on the export of Lockheed Martin's F-22 fighter, thereby making it the exclusive United States fighter. Consequently, in terms of armaments, diversification will inevitably pose challenges in terms of system and data integration between one tool and another, particularly with respect to the eventual integration of fighter aircraft systems. This will be a significant challenge for the Indonesian military, namely the Indonesian National Armed Forces, in the near future. With a positive attitude, it is not impossible to surmount this obstacle. As a result, the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Indonesia and the Indonesian National Armed Forces must act swiftly when confronting this threat in the future.

Conclusion

Indonesia has formulated a Minimum Basic Resilience policy, which is then manifested in its defence diplomacy with arms-producing nations, in order to renew its principal armament system. Indonesia's defence diplomacy is reasonably effective at attracting the attention of weapon-producing nations so that they will compete to provide the best offer for Indonesia. The emergence of AUKUS, which sidelined France from the competition for hegemon in the Indo-Pacific, facilitated France's emergence as a new actor in military and joint cooperation with Indonesia, a result of Indonesia's efforts to woo weapons-producing nations.

The partnership between Indonesia and France has advantages for Indonesia in terms of achieving the Minimum Basic Force, specifically in terms of transferring technology to advance Indonesia's defence industry. Moreover, the agreement between these two countries included the procurement of arms. However, Indonesia faces difficulties with the integration of systems and data on its weapons systems, which originate from numerous nations. Yet, it is not insurmountable given sufficient time.

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