



## Modalities in Khofiah Indah Parawansa's Victory in the 2018 East Java Governor Election

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### ABSTRACT

The dominance of the Muslim community in East Java and the existence of a patriarchal culture affects voter behavior, making it difficult for women to become governors. This study aims to reveal the success factors of women, namely Khofifah Indah Parawansa, to become Governor in East Java from the aspect of his modalities based on Piere Boerdiau's perspective. This research uses a type of qualitative research with narrative analysis. This research shows that Khofifah's victory is inseparable from the ability to maximize all types of modalities owned, namely social capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital. All types of modalities were packaged very well by the political public relations of Khofifah's winning team to win much public sympathy and significantly contribute to Khofifah's victory.

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### INTRODUCTION

Several studies show that politics is not friendly to women's representation and participation (Kaal, 2015; Chetaikina & Vashchanka, 2017; Deckman & McTague, 2015; Gaunder, 2016; Khan et al., 2019; Mishra et al., 2017; Martin, 2020). This is also reinforced by the low representation of women in various political positions, such as in India (Spary, 2020), Japan (Gaunder, 2016), Irlandia (Keenan & McElroy, 2022), Zimbabwe (Ncube & Yemurai, 2020; Gallagher & Marsh, 2016), Malaysia (Yeong, 2018), Kenya (Okinda et al., 2020), Polandia (Sawa-Czajka, 2015) dan Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Region (Chetaikina & Vashchanka, 2017). The same is valid for Indonesia (Bintari, 2020; Sholikin, 2018; Buehler, 2015; Choi, 2019; Darwin & Haryanto, 2021; Lay, 2017; Siregar, 2005; Nurlinaha et al., 2021; Robinson, 2018).

The number of female leaders still needs to grow when compared to men in Indonesia. Men still dominate all regional heads, governors, and presidents. Besides, the number of women in Indonesia is currently increasing. When viewed from the results of the population census in quantity, women in Indonesia have a slightly superior number compared to the number of men.

In the 2018 Regional Head and Deputy Regional Head Elections (Pilkada), as many as 31 women out of 342 people were elected to become deputy regional heads, which is

9.06 percent. When compared with the previous elections, this figure tends to stagnate. In the 2015 Pilkada, 8.7 percent of women won. In 2017, 5.90 percent of women won. There was a decline then, although it rose again the following year. Nevertheless, the difference is only slight and did not show significant results. The results of each simultaneous regional election in 2015, 2017, and 2018 only gave birth to 92 female regional heads who became deputy regional heads. 8.49 percent. They are located in 91 regions of 4 provinces, 69 regencies, and 18 cities from 542 election administration areas. Inequality of women's participation in the simultaneous local elections is still a household job in this country ([Perludem, 2018](#)).

In the 2018 Simultaneous Pilkada, there were 14 women elected as regional heads and 17 as deputy regional heads. Their average win reached 46.84 percent ([Azanella, 2018](#)). Women won in 31 regions (18.13 percent) in 3 provinces (1 governor of East Java, two deputy governors from the Riau Islands, and West Nusa Tenggara/NTB). Moreover, 19 regencies consisting of 10 regents and nine deputy regents, as well as nine cities comprised of 3 mayors and six deputy mayors.

This number only reaches 30.69 percent of those who can win the pilkada based on the 101 women registered as regional head candidates. This electability figure does not show a significant change from Pilkada to Pilkada. In 2015, the electability rate was 37.1 percent, and in the 2017 Pilkada, the electability rate reached 26.67 percent. The difference is little. The supporting parties that succeeded were the Functional Group Party (Golkar), Democrat Party, and National Awakening Party (PKB), which became the most parties joined in the coalition that brought the women who won the 2018 regional elections (54.84) women who won the 2018 regional elections, followed by the Democratic Party (14 from 31-45.16 percent) and PKB (13 from 31-41.94 percent).

As many as 31 women involved in political contestation have backgrounds that, on average, already have a close kinship network (17 out of 31—54.84 percent), party cadres (15 out of 31—48.39 percent), former and members of the legislature (13 out of 31—41.94 percent), and incumbents (9 out of 31—29.03 percent). These four factors are consistent in coloring the unique culture that dares to be a contestant elected from pilkada to pilkada. The seriousness of political parties in recruiting needs to be considered; this kind of culture usually does not have an inclusive mechanism and is open. So the party only looks for female cadres with high electability and popularity.

Indonesia, although women have served as president, namely Megawati and Puan Maharani as chairman of the 2019-2024 Indonesian Parliament, in general, women's political representation is still low, especially in the ranks of legislative members and regional heads. The factor boils down to two things, namely the strength of the patriarchal culture (cultural), gender-biased political party management (structural) to the internal factors of women themselves, making efforts to affirm women's politics in political positions always not optimal.

This article focuses on how Khofifah Indar Parawangsa won the regional elections in East Java amidst the solid patriarchal culture in society and other obstacles. Although she failed several times in her gubernatorial candidacy, she did not give up and continued to innovate strategies to get her current position as Governor of East Java. In the 2018 East Java gubernatorial election, Khofifah Indar Parawansa (Khofifah) teamed up with Emil Elestianto Dardak (Emil Dardak) after running for governor of East Java twice and failing. Khofifah's victory as a female leader in East Java in the third gubernatorial election

needs to be studied in terms of what communication strategies and styles were used to achieve success. By maximizing her modalities, researchers are interested in reviewing what Khofifah Indar Parawansa used in political communication strategies.

In Indonesia, several studies have examined the factors of women's electability in political contestation, primarily regional and legislative elections, from various aspects. For example, From Social Capital (Wungu, 2022;Suhenty, 2020;Rahayu & Chairunnisa, 2021), from the political dynasty aspect (Fitriyah, 2021;Spary, 2020;Marwah & Catur Pratiwi, 2022;Wardani & Subekti, 2021), the right political strategy and communication (Iwan Satriawan, 2018;Salim, 2019). This article takes a different point of view because it uses three aspects at once, namely social capital, political capital, and symbolic capital from Pierre Bourdieu as the key to Khofifah's victory in the 2018 East Java Governor Election, where this approach has never been studied before.

## **METHOD**

Using this type of qualitative research with narrative analysis, the researcher can tell the stages of the plot related to several plots of events in the nomination process of Khofifah Indar Parawansa as the leader of East Java. The description of the events obtained by the researcher will be arranged into a story using a storyline. So qualitative data analysis is in the form of story descriptions and themes that emerge from the interviews (Clandinin, 2007).

Based on the source, the qualitative data obtained in this study uses interview techniques conducted with Surokhim Abdussalam, He is the Dean of FISIP, Trunojoyo Madura University, Political Observer and Researcher at the Surabaya Survey Center, and Suko Widodo, UNAIR Communication Expert, Khofifah Indar Parawansa of the Gubernatorial Election Winning Team 2018 East Java Education Council. Interviews were conducted semi-structured using Zoom.

While the secondary data are text and case data from groups, organizations, mass media documents, online news, talk shows, and Gita Wiriawan podcasts, analyzing qualitative data involves a data sorting team (Moleong, 2000). The data analysis model used by the researcher is the interactive model of Miles & Huberman (2014).

It starts with data condensation, which refers to selecting, simplifying, abstracting, and transforming data that approach all parts of written field notes, interview transcripts, documents, and empirical materials. To get the research focus needed by researchers, followed by the presentation of data (data display) by unifying the information so that later it will help to get precise conclusions by understanding the context of the research for a more in-depth analysis.

Finally, the researcher will conclude by collecting data such as looking for unpatterned understanding and noting the regularity of explanations, and causal pathways, which ends all the data obtained by the researcher in the final stage.

## **FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION**

### **Khofifah's Capital Form as a Female Leader**

According to Pierre Bourdieu, four sources of capital are essential to maintaining power. Capital is a function of social relations that can be considered in exchange. Filed or also known as realm, arena, terrain, for Bourdieu, a social actor will compete with each other in the field of competition to obtain sources of strength or power.

Khofifah Indar Parawansa, the capital mentioned by Bourdieu, can lead to the position of a female laughing leader in East Java. The concept of the arena explains that there needs to be a network or a configuration of objective relations between the objectively defined positions in their existence and the determinations they apply to their adherents, people, or institutions. Likewise, in the distribution structure of power or capital, whose control directs access to specific benefits at stake in the arena and their objective relationship with other positions ([Bourdieu in Jenkins, 2010, p. 124](#)).

Sources of capital, for Bourdieu, become an essential part of maintaining power and capital as a function of social relations that can be considered for social exchange. Capital here is a crucial instrument for preserving or maintaining the power of an actor/agent. Khofifah, in this case, is not an actor who is in control, but she is a social actor who finally succeeded in becoming a female leader in East Java. He has the capital to be able to reach that power. Khofifah's sources of capital, the various sources of capital she has to make Khofifah seen in society.

The definition of capital, in general, is something, both objects and non-objects, that we have as humans or living beings, such as social, cultural, economic, political, and other sources of capital. With a source of capital, it can be used by a social actor for personal and group interests. According to Bourdieu, capital is a collection of sources of power and power that can be used. This capital is closely related to the relations of strength and power in society ([Jenkins, 2010](#)).

Bourdieu divides the sources of capital into four essential components or parts: sources of social capital, economic capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital. Social capital is networks owned by actors (individuals or groups) about other parties with power. Khofifah with the Women's Community Organization, namely Muslimat Nahdatul Ulama (NU). Since childhood, Khofifah was active in a recitation routine called a promise because her mother was an NU Muslim administrator. She helped her mother manage the needs needed for tiered activities until, finally, she was trusted as a teenager and was given the responsibility of the treasurer to manage all the conditions at that time. The cadre continued until Khofifah finally entered the Muslimat NU structure and managed to lead for over 20 years. It is a social capital that he already owns. He has now shown an association of religious organizations that he has followed since childhood for a long time. In the process of its activities, interactions between the chairman and all members have been carried out for years.

NU Muslim members, of course, already know the extent of their integrity until many times during their candidacy, Khofifah is still elected as leader. NU Muslimat members have given this extraordinary form of trust to Khofifah. Khofifah's leadership at Muslimat NU certainly brought significant changes so that for 20 years, Khofifah has remained and is trusted. His leadership capacity has been tested and recognized by the NU community so that everyone supported him when he entered the political contestation in the East Java Pilgub.

The involvement of Muslimat NU in Khofifah's winning strategy had a significant enough role in winning the 2018 gubernatorial election. The Khofifah-Emil Winning Team even said that Muslimat NU was far more militant and supportive than supporting political parties. A week before polling day, an internal survey of the Khofifah winning team found that 60% of Khofifah-Emil's voters were women. Khofifah Indar Parawansa said it could not be separated from the influence and involvement of NU Muslimat. In the

2018 East Java gubernatorial election, the East Java Regional KPU determined Khofifah-Emil as the winner with a vote of 10,465,218 votes or a percentage of 53.55%.

The role and performance of Muslimat NU in carrying out the winning strategy are carried out with a mature plan and strategy—this strategy of strengthening the figure of Nahdliyin as social capital was used to gain NU votes. The potential of NU's voice in the 2018 East Java gubernatorial election is enormous. It is because the people of East Java are mostly Nahdliyin residents. In addition, patron-client relationships are very thick in all aspects of life, including political choices. Muslimat NU has recognized this as a voting bag that must be optimized.

Although in the 2018 East Java gubernatorial election, NU's voice was split into two because Saifullah Yusuf is also a PBNU elite whom many NU clerics and scholar's support. Saifullah Yusuf has also made his tagline from the start as the great-grandson of the founder of NU. The strategy to boost Nahdliyin's vote to elect Khofifah-Emil was to strengthen Khofifah's image and branding as a faithful Nahdliyin cadre and citizen. The way to do this is to take advantage of his position as chairman of Muslimat NU and establish political communication with NU scholars and Islamic boarding schools, such as the support of KH. Solahudin Wahid and Tebuireng. Khofifah's support and closeness with Tebuireng were then shown to the public to create a narrative of Khofifah together with Tebuireng, and Tebuireng was an inseparable part of the founding of NU.

As chairman, Khofifah can influence formal and non-formal spaces to unite her vision and mission to become a female leader in East Java. The amount of time that is not small must be strengthened even though Khofifah has lost. Even though they lost, Muslimat still wanted Khofifah to be the representation of women in Muslimat for Bangas. It was proven that when he became a minister, Muslimat still chose Khofifah as a leader in Muslimat NU. Likewise, when Khofifah had lost twice to the previous East Java PILGUB, she was still supported to run again in the 2018 East Java gubernatorial election. The loyalty and solidarity of NU Muslimat became a significant social capital for Khofifah. If the Muslimat NU has become a capital, other capital is needed to become a leader in East Java from among women.

In another concept, Bourdieu also explains economic capital. Still, the researcher wants to discuss this in less detail because the researcher will elaborate more on cultural capital and symbolic capital in Khofifah. Bourdieu states that the source of cultural capital is the overall intellectual qualification that can be produced through formal education or family inheritance. Cultural capital implies a learning process so that it cannot be given to others. This cultural capital includes a person's ability to present himself publicly, knowledge and specific expertise from formal and non-formal education results, and a certificate or bachelor's degree (Jenkins, 2010).

In this context, Khofifah grew up in a very supportive environment to become a person who has a strong leadership spirit. Since childhood, he has been involved in various activities in the village that provide non-formal education in him so that it has a tremendous impact. The spirit of militancy and leadership has been trained since childhood. In his town, he is often taught to instill the process of cooperation and leadership. In grade 3 SD, Khofifah has become her village's treasurer of the *zanji* (routine recitation) community. He accommodates 75-80 people in the 3rd grade of elementary school. He has a weekly income so that he can manage each recitation. Many in his village environment are already proficient in giving speeches, so he must also master it.

Khofifah's first speech was when she was in grade 6. There was a guide at that time, a South Sumatran who was studying at IAIN Surabaya. Every month of Muharram in his village, there are various competitions, including speech competitions and reading the Koran. Since childhood, the children in his town have been used to participating. Likewise, when the Prophet's Birthday, there was a similar competition in August, so such competitions have often been followed. Every Friday night, all the children are also rotated to be the MC. Little Khofifah was given a script that was ready to be read.

There is also a moment to become a lecturer in the village. Because in the tiered activities, the children are used to doing it. If not, then something feels odd. Learning by doing in stages is the capital to becoming a leader and having skills. Through these activities with promises or promises, they can build a more substantive brotherhood among citizens. The sense of cooperation will grow, and food support is also sufficient because there will always be a celebration. Sufficient. There was no bullying activity at that time; everyone respected each other even though no special lessons were delivered, but indirectly, each child involved carried out the practice naturally. That is the culture built on a promise.

At that time, little Khofifah and her friends were greatly supported by her village parents. Even though the activity lasted one to two hours, no one protested. The same perception is built between parents because of the frequent meetings in the village. This religious activity continued until he grew up, and when he was in college, he studied political science and spiritual science simultaneously. By studying political science, Khofifah became more mature in her politics until he finally entered a political party. Moreover, with the deepening of his religious knowledge, he participated in Muslim organizations for many years. The researcher feels that this is a cultural combination that has become Khofifah's capital to be able to take part as a female leader in East Java.

In explaining symbolic capital, Bourdieu said that this is all forms of accumulated prestige, status, authority, and legitimacy. This type of resource is optimized for achieving symbolic power and often requires symbols of energy such as position, position, title, famous family, possessions of luxury goods and objects, and others. Symbolic capital owned by a person is intended as all forms of recognition by the group, either institutionally or non-institutionally.

The symbol itself has the power to be able to construct reality. It can lead people to believe it, acknowledge it, and change their view of the reality of a person, group, organization, political party, or nation. Khofifah, as a woman who has been involved in politics from a young age, has its advantages. As a female politician, she has a mature strategy so that they can compete with men who dominate political activity. The political steps she chose were calculated, even though she failed twice in the East Java gubernatorial election. Still, in the 2018 East Java gubernatorial election, she proved her strength as a superior female politician.

The various opportunities she did as a female politician were enough to open the eyes of the community to her presence as a woman who dared to speak up. Khofifah's political activities can be seen in all of her strategic steps, such as her direct action when she read out her general views at the plenary session of the DPR in the new order. While others were silent, Khofifah showed her courage as a young female politician to be able to convey criticisms of the government. It was enough to seize the public. Many media highlighted the action. Her presence as a young female politician at that time did not

dampen her steps to continue to dare to express opinions, to criticize the government. Likewise, when Gus Dur appointed him to be one of the leaders in the PKB, at that time, only a few women became leaders. However, Khofifah can be present in alienation.

He ran for governor of East Java in 2008. At that time, he was fighting against four pairs of candidates, namely, Sutjipto-Ridwan Hisjam (SR), Soenarjo-Ali Maschan Moesa (Salam), Achmady-Suhartono (Achsani), and Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf. (Intention). However, the ones who advanced in the second round were Khofifah and Soekarwo. The competition in the second round was very tight, but in the end, Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf (KarSa) won the 2008 East Java gubernatorial election with 50.11 percent of the votes. Meanwhile, Khofifah had to stand down with 49.89 votes.

In 2013 Khofifah Indar Parawansa ran for governor of East Java again with Herman Sumawiredja, but the Khofifah-Herman pair at that time could not beat the Soekarwo-Saifullah Yusuf pair. During the recapitulation of votes from 18 sub-districts in Magetan Regency, the incumbent pair number 1 Soekarwo - Saifulah Yusuf won by acquiring 236,108 votes or 68 percent. Then, pair number 4 Khofifah - Herman through the purchase, winning 67,233 votes.

Even though Khofifah had twice failed in political contestations in the East Java Pilgub, having lost twice in the nominations for the Governor of East Java, Khofifah can still show her progress as a female politician. She maximized her performance by continuing to contribute, such as when she was a spokesperson for Jokowi - JK. The victory of the Jokowi - JK team gave her a better chance to be recognized by the broader community by becoming Social Minister.

Khofifah's success while serving as Minister of Social Affairs in the Working Indonesia Cabinet is considered by Muslimat NU as an essential asset. Khofifah was considered capable of carrying out her duties well when she was the minister of social affairs through various programs and steps deemed beneficial to the community. For example, the Family Hope Program (PKH) benefits poor and underprivileged families in Indonesia. According to Bourdieu, various positions are symbols that have the power to be able to construct reality. This symbolic capital led people to believe in it, acknowledge it, and change people's views about Khofifah Indar Parawansah. Khofifah's role in politics from a young age brought her strength, and researchers call it political capital. Khofifah to become a leader in East Java is the fruit of the various assets that Khofifah has.

### **Public Relations (PR) Khofifah's Politics in Seeking Public Sympathy**

The steps taken by Khofifah Indar Pawaransa are inseparable from PR activities. It is generally done among politicians, especially in all practical political activities. An essential political PR strategy is used to restore his image, especially since Khofifah has twice failed in the political contestation for the East Java gubernatorial election. Khofifah uses not only political marketing but also political PR to maximize the capital that Khofifah already has. Khofifah has much money, and the importance of PR work here will improve Khofifah's image so that the public increasingly knows it.

The researcher divides into three phases of Khofifah's journey in obtaining capital which is carried out using Political PR—first, the phase of being a young politician. Khofifah's political activities were evident when she became a young politician. Khofifah was the one who openly read out general views at the plenary session of the DPR during the New Order era. While others were silent, Khofifah showed her courage as a young female politician to be able to express criticism of the government. It was enough to grab

the public's attention. Many media highlighted the action. Her presence as a young female politician did not dampen her steps to continue to dare to express opinions and criticize the government. Likewise, when Gus Dur appointed him to be one of the leaders in PKB, at that time, few women became leaders. However, Khofifah can be present in alienation. It is undoubtedly in line with the concept of Political PR in creating a good reputation as a female politician, which must be built over a long period. He had to make well until he was finally elected as an East Java leader in 2018.

Second, in the middle phase. When Khofifah ran for office twice and failed to become the governor of East Java, she did not remain silent. Khofifah did well in political communication, so she was elected as the spokesperson for the Jokowi-JK campaign. As a result, Jokowi-JK won the 2014 presidential election. After that, Khofifah was appointed Minister of Social Affairs. In the 2008 and 2013 gubernatorial elections, Khofifah, as a woman, has not been trusted by the public to be able to lead East Java. As a potential female leader, she can show that she can work for the country, be trusted, and take responsibility for carrying out the public mandate for her position. It can be proven by the various programs he did when he was Minister of Social Affairs.

The Family Hope Program (PKH) from Khofifah is in the public spotlight, and many people have benefited from the program. Survey results from several institutions, such as the World Bank, Bappenas, and TNP2K, stated that PKH significantly reduced poverty in Indonesia ([Post, 2018](#)). The latest BPS data from September 2015 to March 2016 shows that this country's poverty rate has fallen to 500 thousand people. According to the Ministry of Social's data on the independence of layoffs at that time, 400 thousand of PKH recipients were already independent and separated from the PKH program ([Post, 2018](#))

On another occasion, Khofifah was also invited to a talk show program. Thanks to Khofifah's seriousness and good performance, Khofifah is often asked to talk show programs on TV media compared to other ministers. As in the Rosi program, Kompas TV discusses the eradication of violence against women (Silalahi, 2016). With his sincerity, she talked about what had been done to the victims, which brought tears to his eyes. It is enough to attract public sympathy. These are not just pretended tears. She conveys with great willingness and empathy in every word she utters because she is a woman who has overcome various problems of violence against women. At that time, not many violence issues dared to be raised in public because there was no precise case management regulation, unlike today, which has been detected with the TPKS Law. So public sympathy is focused on what he has done. The work ethic of a top leader in the Ministry of Social Affairs is evident, and the work program and its results can be seen progressively by the public.

According to [Ardianto \(2008\)](#), political PR differs from political marketing. Political marketing prioritizes selling ideas and is only used at certain moments, for example, during a nomination during a political campaign. Meanwhile, political PR prioritizes image and reputation building, and this cannot be instant. Political PR in Indonesia should no longer be used for general election purposes but is needed almost always.

Khofifah Indar Parawansa built a good reputation with various performances performed by the public. It is part of political communication. Political PR is part of the realm of political communication. In line with what [Heryanto and Zarkasy \(2012\)](#) said, Khofifah's political PR is one of the processes to achieve political goals in activities



related to mutual understanding and goodwill. will) of the internal public and the external public of an institution or political organization.

### **Halo Effect is Strengthening the Caliph as a Female Leader**

The Halo Effect was first introduced in 1920 by one of the crucial figures in the world of Psychology, Edward L. Thorndike, a psychologist who conducted a series of experiments on evaluating other people. The Halo effect is closely related to our assumptions or social biases, which are always associated with what is visible to the naked eye, what the person concerned looks like, what they do when we see them, or in terms of appearance, which affects how they are we perceive people.

The halo effect occurs when a person evaluates others positively based only on first impressions. It is not entirely wrong, but it can hurt life in certain situations, such as in the presence of Khofifah Indar Paransa when he ran for governor of East Java in 2018. Khofifah's closeness to Jokowi was also enough to boost victory. There was an element of the Jokowi effect inherent in him. Indirectly Khofifah's political image is "Khofifah is Jokowi's person." One social capital that Khofifah has is her close relationship with Jokowi. Since the 2014 presidential election, Khofifah has been an active person in supporting Jokowi.

Khofifah even entered as part of the Jokowi-JK Winning Team as a spokesperson. Khofifah and Jokowi's closeness continued when Khofifah occupied the Minister of Social Affairs seat in the Working Indonesia Cabinet. Jokowi's achievements and good reputation in leading the ministry are also often praised. Khofifah is very good, able to take advantage of every moment she served as Minister of Social Affairs. This closeness to Jokowi is also part of Khofifah's capital to win the hearts of the people of East Java. Muslimat NU itself calls it the "Jokowi Effect."

The term Jokowi effect itself is not new. The term refers to a person's closeness to Jokowi, which can increase a person's level of popularity and electability in general elections. For the Winning Team, including Muslimat NU, Jokowi's support base in East Java is quite large. The Khofifah-Emil Winning Team also used this to win the votes of Jokowi's supporters.

Likewise, when Khofifah ran for the 2018 East Java gubernatorial election, she ran with her partner Emil Dardak whom the Democratic party promoted. We all know that East Java had been led by Soekarwo, who was from the Democratic Party in the previous two periods. If in the past Khofifah was Sorkarwo's rival in the gubernatorial election, this time, Khofifah was Soekarwo's partner. As a leader who has twice managed East Java, of course, Soekarwo has strong enough power so that the impression and sympathy of the public will be on who will continue Soekarwo's struggle in leading East Java. Moreover, Khofifah - Emil in the 2018 East Java Pigub is a team in the same party as Soekarwo, so some of these observers are "Soekarwo Efect."

Also, "Risma Efect" also strengthened Khofifah's victory as a female leader in East Java." Two defeats during the period of Khofifah running for governor were also heavily attacked with the issue that female leaders were haram. Khofifah also had to befriend several *Kyai* to open these wrong thoughts until a Kiai in Mojokerto wrote down his views on the idea that female leaders were yes and can. It can slightly reduce the wild issues that arise. It is coupled with the presence of Risma, whose figure is firm and often carries out spontaneous activities that leaders rarely carry out.

When there was a traffic jam, he went down to regulate traffic, and when garbage was being handed over, Risma could set an example by picking up the trash. The presence of women like Risma has been in the media spotlight and has opened their eyes to the fact that women can lead and even use their hearts more by being involved in solving problems. So that the candidacy of Khofifah as a female leader in East Java in 2018 could be more accepted by the community.

In the theory of implicit personality, the "Halo Effect." If we believe a person has several positive qualities, we conclude he also has other positive attributes. The community's conclusion towards Khofifah Indar Parawansah led to her being elected and accepted as a female leader in East Java.

## **CONCLUSION**

Being a female leader is a challenging job. There must be considerable capital to be able to get that power. Khofifah worked for a long time to get enough capital, following what Bourdieu said: cultural, social, and symbolic capital. This capital can construct reality and lead people to believe it, acknowledge it, and change their view of one's reality. This capital will work better when balanced with Political Public Relations activities so that people will quickly recognize the good values in Khofifah. Her political communication skills primarily determine Khofifah's success in winning the East Java regional election in maximizing her social, cultural, and symbolic modalities.

This research needs to be improved by further articles because of several limitations; there is no in-depth elaboration of the economic capital behind Khofifah's victory. Economic capital becomes crucial because the political costs in the Indonesian elections are costly. Further research can analyze in depth the economic capital used by Khofifah so that it can be mapped how much money Khofifah spent and where it came from.

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