

## **Political Recruitment and Party Institutionalization: PDIP's Internal Tension in the 2020 Surakarta Mayoral Election**

**Tunjung Sulaksono<sup>1</sup>, Janur Dikya Sungkawa<sup>2</sup>, Suswanta Suswanta<sup>3</sup>, Arissy Jorgi Sutan<sup>4</sup>**

<sup>1,2</sup>Department of Government Science, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

<sup>3,4</sup> Master of Government Affairs and Administration, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta, Indonesia

\*Corresponding author: [tunjung.sulaksono@umy.ac.id](mailto:tunjung.sulaksono@umy.ac.id)

### **ABSTRACT**

This article aims to explain the causes of internal tension within the Indonesian Democratic Party—Struggle (PDIP) Party. The internal tension occurred vertically and horizontally due to the party's central office intervention in the recruitment process for the 2020 Surakarta mayoral candidate. The intervention caused disappointment among Surakarta Branch Leadership Council (DPC) Surakarta cadres towards the PDIP's Central Leadership Council (DPP) policies and deconsolidation within the DPC level prior to the election. The research approach used is descriptive-qualitative, with data collection techniques used are documentary and literature studies. In contrast to the explanation of previous works that emphasize the oligarchy and centralism of decision-making, this article shows that the cause of the internal tension within the PDIP Party is the low degree of party institutionalization, especially in the systemness and decisional autonomy dimensions.

### **Article Info :**

#### **Article History :**

Received : November 4, 2022

Revised : March 23, 2023

Accepted : March 30, 2023

#### **Keywords:**

political recruitment; PDIP;  
mayoral election; party  
institutionalization;  
Surakarta City

### **INTRODUCTION**

This article attempts to explain the causes of internal tension within the PDIP Party in the 2020 Surakarta mayoral election. The internal tension occurred both vertically as well as horizontally. Vertically, tension occurred between the DPC (party structure at the city level) and DPP (party's central board) elites. While horizontally, internal tensions emerged at the DPC level due to cadres at the DPC level being divided between defending the DPP's decision and defending the DPC's attitude.

The internal mechanism for determining the mayoral candidate in PDIP is far more interesting than the mayoral election process. Based on calculations of party strength, any candidates promoted by PDIP Party in this city will have a tremendous opportunity to win the election. The opportunity always turns into Victory.

Please cite this article as: Sulaksono, T., Suswanta, S., Sungkawa, J. D., & Sutan, A. J. (2023). Political Recruitment and Party Institutionalization: PDIP's Internal Tension the 2020 Surakarta Mayoral Election. *Journal of Local Government Issues (LOGOS)*, 6(1), 1-18. <https://doi.org/10.22219/logos.v6i1.23121>

Since the first mayoral election held in Surakarta City in 2005, PDIP has always managed to win its candidates (Adhitia, 2019). Since the beginning years of the reform, PDIP has been the strongest party in the city. Its seat gains also continued to increase from one election to the next. Referring to Law Number 10 of 2016 on local government head election, PDIP can nominate a candidate pair for mayor and deputy mayor of Surakarta without forming an electoral coalition with other parties (Rafiq, 2019).

The 2020 Surakarta mayoral election is interesting to study because it revealed internal tension within the PDIP Party, frequently referred to as continuing the ideological tradition of prioritizing nationalism (Fosatti, 2020). The PDIP's central board intervened in recruitment by making two policies. First, the DPP made new rules to open the Surakarta mayoral candidate recruitment process, which had previously been declared closed by the DPC of Surakarta since it had chosen a mayoral candidate using the party's rules. Second, the DPP allows cadre with insufficient membership duration to register for mayor candidate recruitment. Two policies issued by DPP had allowed Gibran Rakabuming Raka, President Jokowi's eldest son, to participate in the internal selection process for the mayor of Surakarta candidate. Even though PDIP Party continued its winning tradition, the 2020 Surakarta mayoral election revealed severe problems in the party's political recruitment mechanism (Isnanto, 2019a).

In the party regulation Number 24 of 2017 concerning the Selection and Recruitment of Regional Head Candidates and Deputy Regional Head Candidates that became the guideline for DPC PDIP of Surakarta, specifically in Article 10 paragraph 4, it has been regulated that for regions that obtain party seats above 20% or the party's vote acquisition is over 25% in the last legislative election. The party's DPC can carry out closed recruitment from the lower levels. According to the regulations, the DPC of Surakarta could not open registration and only use a closed recruitment mechanism. In a closed recruitment process, the DPC of Surakarta proposed Achmad Purnomo and Teguh Prakosa to the DPP PDIP. The opportunity for Gibran to register through the DPC Surakarta City was automatically closed (Isnanto, 2019b).

Moreover, to register as a regional head candidate, a cadre or party member must have been a member for at least three years and attach a recommendation from the DPC. Gibran has only been a party member for less than three months from the time he registered as a party member until he registered for the mayor election through the DPD (party structure at the provincial level) of Central Java. Gibran also failed to get a recommendation from the DPC of Surakarta since the mayor of Surakarta's candidate recruitment process within PDIP's DPC was over by the approval of Achmad Purnomo and Teguh Prakoso as party's candidate pairs.

Gibran was unfazed by the DPC's closure of the internal recruitment process for the mayor of Surakarta. Gibran personally met PDIP Chair Megawati Sukarnoputri in Jakarta. Gibran eventually had a chance to enter the recruitment process through the PDIP's provincial board (DPD) of Central Java Province. Gibran's chance came with party decree No. 918/IN/DPP/XI/2019, dated November 21, 2019, regarding the 2020 Simultaneous Regional Government Head Elections (Sunaryo, 2019).

With the DPP's policy issuance, Gibran could continue his political ambition to register as a Surakarta mayoral candidate through the PDIP's DPD of Central Java. During the reopening of the recruitment process, two candidates for mayor of Surakarta were asked for recommendations to the DPP, namely Achmad Purnomo, who had been recruited by the DPC of Surakarta, and Gibran, who registered through the DPD of Central

Java. The candidate who receives a recommendation from the DPP will later be assigned to run for Surakarta mayoral election by carrying the PDIP party's ticket.

Based on the abovementioned problems, this article examines why PDI-P has internal tension in the 2020 Surakarta mayor election. This paper managed to seek exciting findings related to internal tension in the party's body due to political recruitment issues. In contrast to the explanation of previous works that emphasize the oligarchy and centralism of decision-making, this article shows that the cause of the internal tension within the PDIP Party is the low degree of party institutionalization, especially in the systemness and decisional autonomy dimensions.

**METHOD**

This study was conducted by using party institutionalization theory as its theoretical approach. This theory mainly proposes that the dysfunction of a party is the impact of the low degree of party institutionalization (Randall & Svasand, 2002). This study uses a qualitative research design. Data collection is carried out by employing documentary study methods, including analysis of any books, news, and documents related to the study. Conclusion drawing of this study uses the model developed by Miles, Huberman, and Saldana (2014) which includes the data collecting stage, data reduction stage, data presentation stage, and drawing conclusion stage.

**RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

Surakarta, or "Solo," is a city in Central Java Province's eastern part. It has an area of 44.04 km<sup>2</sup> and is divided into five districts. In 2020, it had a population of 522,364, with 257,043 male and 265,321 female residents (BPS Surakarta, 2021). Surakarta City KPU designated 418,283 people on the Permanent Voters List (DPT) for December 9, 2020, election (Marwoto, 2020).

Surakarta has become a political concern in the last decade. In 2012, PDIP-backed Surakarta Mayor Jokowi ran for Jakarta Governor and won, a victory that is often referred to as the phenomenon of populism (Hamid, 2014). Jokowi ran for president two years after becoming DKI Jakarta's governor and won. In 2019, Jokowi was re-elected. In 2020, President Jokowi's son, Gibran, ran for Surakarta mayor through PDIP and managed to win the election by leaving a precedent that tends to be problematic for the party's internal mechanisms in the political recruitment process. It also caused internal tension within the PDIP.

Gibran's victory was not an extraordinary phenomenon. The political constellation in Surakarta since the beginning of the reform has shown a relatively uncompetitive party system. It happened because the PDIP is too dominant in the city. This dominance can be seen through the Surakarta DPRD (city council) seat acquisition and the victories of the PDIP mayoral candidate pair in the last few elections, as shown in Table 1.

**Table 1.** Party Seats in the last Three Legislative Elections in Surakarta City

No	Party	Years of Election		
		2009	2014	2019
1.	Nasdem	-	-	-
2.	PKB	-	-	-
3.	PKS	4	5	5
4.	PDIP	15	24	30
5.	Golkar	4	4	3

6.	Gerindra	2	3	3
7.	Demokrat	7	3	-
8.	PAN	4	4	3
9.	PPP		1	
10.	Hanura	2	1	
11.	PBB	-	-	-
12.	PKPI	-	-	-
13.	PSI	-	-	1
14.	PDS	2	-	-
Total		40	45	45

Source: Statistics of Surakarta City (2009, 2015, 2020)

The table shows PDIP's dominance in the last three legislative elections. Appear an increasing trend in PDIP seats in Surakarta's city council. PDIP won 15 of 40 DPRD seats in 2009. In 2014, PDIP seats increased by 9 to 24 to match the Surakarta City DPRD seats increase. PDIP won 30 of 45 DPRD seats in 2019. It shows PDIP's dominance in Surakarta City politics over the last decade.

As in the legislature, PDIP also dominates Surakarta's mayoral elections. Because of its high number of DPRD seat acquisitions, PDIP can nominate candidates without forming a coalition. PDIP does not need to consider its coalition partners' interests. Therefore they are more flexible in implementing recruitment strategies to win the mayoral elections. PDIP has outperformed its competitors in the last three mayoral elections, as shown in Table 2.

**Table 2.** The Results of Surakarta City Mayoral Elections (2010, 2015, and 2020)

Year of Election	Candidates	Proposing Party(ies)	Result	
			votes	%
2010	Joko Widodo (Jokowi) - FX Hadi Rudyatmo (Rudy)	PDIP	248,243	90.09
	Eddy S. Wirabhumi-Supradi Kertamenawi,	Democrat Party, Golkar Party	27,306	9.91
Election Result			<b>275,549</b>	<b>100.00</b>
2015	Anung Indro Susanto -Muhammad Fajri	PKS, PAN, Democrat Party, Gerindra Party	111,462	<b>39.61</b>
	FX. Hadi Rudyatmo (Rudy) - Achmad Purnomo	PDIP	169,904	60.39%
Election Result			<b>281,364</b>	<b>100.00</b>
2020	Gibran Rakabuming-Teguh Prakosa	PDIP	225,451	86.61
	Bagyo Wahyono-F.X. Supardjo	Independent/non-party	35,055	13.39
Election Result			<b>260,506</b>	<b>100.00</b>

Source: [Surakarta City General Election Commission, 2021](#)

In 2010, the PDIP Party's candidate, Jokowi – Rudy, won the mayoral election. At that time, they were incumbents since they won the 2005 mayoral election. Their opponent was Eddy Wirabhumi, the chairman of the Democratic Party's branch of Surakarta City. He was paired with Supradi, a former acting Secretary of the Surakarta City Government. PDIP managed to lead Jokowi - Rudy to an absolute victory with the acquisition of 248.243 votes or 90.09%, defeating Eddy - Supradi, that supported by the Democratic Party and the Golkar Party. This percentage of the vote won by Jokowi - Rudy is perhaps the most significant number to date in the history of mayoral elections in Indonesia

In the 2015 mayoral elections, the candidates proposed by the PDIP party were Rudy and Achmad Purnomo. Rudy was Jokowi's deputy in the previous period. Achmad Purnomo was the deputy mayor proposed by the PDIP party to fill the vacancy in the deputy mayor seat due to the appointment of Rudy to replace Jokowi's position as mayor. Jokowi had to leave his ongoing mayoral seat to compete in the 2012 DKI Jakarta governor election. Their opponent at that time was Anung Indro Susanto, a civil servant of the Surakarta City Government who was paired with Muhammad Fajri, a former member of the Surakarta City DPRD.

In the 2020 Surakarta mayoral election, PDIP managed to maintain its absolute victory. Gibran - Teguh received 225,451 votes or 86.61%, beating Bagyo Wahyono - FX—Suparjo, who ran for election from the non-party mechanism. Bagyo and Suparjo only managed to collect 35,055 votes, or 13.39% of the total votes. Gibran's background is as a culinary businessman, and he has relatively no previous political experience. Meanwhile, Teguh Prakosa is the Secretary of the DPC of Surakarta and a former member of Surakarta DPRD. This result also proves the dominance of the PDIP in Surakarta for winning the mayoral elections four consecutive times since 2005. More broadly, these results also emphasize the victory of party candidates over independent candidates in the regional head elections in Indonesia (Dinarto & Ng, 2020).

**Table 3.** Comparison of Winning Independents and Party-Nominated Candidates in 2015, 2017, and 2018 Regional Head Elections

Type of candidates	Total	2015	2017	2018	Success Rate
Independents	289	13	3	3	6.57
Party nominees	1361	254	96	165	37.84

Source: Dinarto & Ng (2020)

How to explain problems in Surakarta's mayoral recruitment process that led to internal tension? Research on the recruitment process of local government leaders shows that internal tension occurs as major parties often reject party cadres proposed by local party structures. It explains why the central party structure still determines the pattern of regional head candidate decisions. Local executive election candidates are heavily centralized. Junaidi Nim's research on Golkar Party political recruitment for the 2018 Pontianak mayoral elections provides clear evidence (Nim, 2018).

Anggoro et al. (2020) examined the PAN's Tasikmalaya City branch in the 2017 mayoral candidate recruitment process. The study found an oligarchic nuance in PAN's recruitment process because party elites determined who would be promoted. Oligarchy

defeated PAN's internal cadres. External party figures with strong financial sources eventually got the party ticket.

Adelia (2020) offered another answer. Her research found that "buying and selling" recommendations compromise the ideals of political parties' regional head recruitment processes. A candidate must pay some money to get a political party's nomination. "Political dowry" describes this phenomenon. Political dowry undermines the ideal of the party's political recruitment mechanism and creates disenchantment among party cadres.

These answers address symptoms, not the causes of parties' recruitment problems. Centralization, oligarchy, and transactional politics are symptoms of problems in parties' local government head recruitment processes. Thus, the explanations provided by previous research do not explain the root of the problem in the party's political recruitment process.

In this article, the theory of party institutionalization is considered a potential framework for explaining this situation. Party institutionalization has not been widely used to explain the problem of political recruitment in parties. This theory explains why parties are not performing their democratic duties optimally. According to this theory, parties fail to perform their functions due to the low degree of institutionalization. According to this framework, centralization, oligarchy, and transactional politics are symptoms of low-party institutionalization (Justwan et al., 2022). The author will use this theoretical framework to explain PDIP's internal tensions in recruiting 2020 Surakarta mayoral candidates.

One of the functions of political parties in a democratic political system is political recruitment (Cole, 2020; Eichenberger et al., 2019), a function typical for political parties (Fitriyah, 2020). The nominated candidate determines the party's characteristics for political parties because political recruitment shows the party's typology. Whether a party is a mass party, cadre, catch-all, cartel, or business firm can be seen from how political recruitment is carried out by the party.

Political parties recruit new members and talented people to participate in politics—new members and candidates for public offices. Political recruitment is selecting and appointing candidates for political and government leadership (Fitriyah, 2020). Political parties nominate candidates for local offices, including mayors. Political parties in Indonesia are the primary institution with authority to recruit candidates based on Law no. 2 of 2011 concerning Political Parties. This Law confirms that political parties recruit Indonesian citizens to run for governor, major, regent, and deputy. Although Law No. 12 of 2008 opened nominations through individual channels, it is still less attractive (Fitriyah, 2020).

In entering the 2020 mayoral contestation, the DPC PDIP of Surakarta uses Party Regulation Number 24 of 2017 concerning selecting and recruiting candidates for local government heads and deputy regional heads candidates to conduct its recruitment role. DPC PDIP uses a closed mechanism to select candidates for mayor and deputy mayor based on these parties' rules.

**Tabel 4.** Structure of PDIP Party

No	Party Structure	Level
1	Central Leadership Council (DPP)	Central/National
2	Regional Leadership Council (DPD)	Province
3	Branch Leadership Council (DPC)	City/Regency
4	Sub Branch Management (PAC)	district
5	Twig Management	Village
8	Branch Management	Hamlet

Source: [Constitution of PDIP Party \(2019\)](#)

Article 9, paragraph 1 of the regulation states that a party may assign party members or cadres as candidates for regional head and/or deputy regional head by carrying out their own or forming a coalition with other political parties if: (a) the party's vote gains 25% or the acquisition of party seats 20%; (b) the incumbent regional head is a party cadre who ran the government well in the previous ([PDIP, 2017](#)).

Meanwhile, concerning the closed screening mechanism, it is explicitly described in Article 10, paragraph 4, which states that "The Party Leadership Council at its level delivers official notifications/announcements to all levels of the legislature, executive, cadres, administrators, members, and Party sympathizers, secretly regarding the selection of prospective candidates. If the party's vote acquisition is more than 25% or the party's seat acquisition is more than 20% in the last legislative election ([PDIP, 2017](#)).

The closed recruitment mechanism means that DPC PDIP of Surakarta did not offer open recruitment to all citizens. The DPC made appointments through an internal party structure; only party members and cadres can run for mayor and deputy mayor. The DPC of Surakarta held deliberations from the district level (PACs) to the DPC level to select the party's most promising candidates. Rudy confirmed this statement, explaining that the DPC did not open registration but assigned candidates for the 2020 regional elections. Through this internal mechanism, the DPC party structure nominated its cadres

The bottom-up selection effort resulted in a unanimous decision to propose the pair Achmad Purnomo and Teguh Prakosa to compete in the 2020 Surakarta mayoral election. However, both names will not automatically be registered with Surakarta's Electoral Commission (KPU). Both still have to get a recommendation from the DPP. Since only one pair of candidate names is proposed to the DPP by DPC, logically, a recommendation will be given to the proposed name.

A fascinating dynamic began when the party's DPC level selection was over, and the decision was made to propose Achmad Purnomo and Teguh Prakosa. Gibran Rakabuming Raka appeared through a survey conducted in July 2019 by the Public Policy Laboratory of Slamet Riyadi University. The survey tested three categories: popularity, acceptability, and electability ([Persada, 2019](#)). In the survey, Gibran and Achmad Purnomo emerged with the highest number in terms of popularity, where according to the survey results, of the total number of respondents, 90 percent knew Gibran and Achmad Purnomo, while the name Kaesang appeared in third place. Kaesang is Gibran's brother. Despite winning in popularity, Gibran and Kaesang are still lagging behind Achmad Purnomo regarding acceptability and electability ([Hakim, 2021](#)).

The results of this survey seemed to tempt Gibran to register as a candidate for mayor of Surakarta through the DPC PDIP of Surakarta. However, because the process for

selecting mayor candidates had been closed and the candidate names had been decided, the DPC of Surakarta then refused Gibran to register through the DPC. DPC of Surakarta Chairman Rudy confirmed that he had closed the selection process for candidates for Surakarta Mayor in the 2020 mayoral election (Isnanto, 2019b).

Although there are party regulations regarding the mechanism for the recruitment of regional head candidates in PDIP, as described above, it turns out that there are differences in interpretation between PDIP administrators in the DPC and those at the DPP. Rudy emphasized that the DPC's closed recruitment followed party regulation Number 24 of 2017. According to Rudy, regional head candidates are not registered in the DPP but in the DPD and DPC. In the case of the Surakarta mayoral candidate, it becomes the domain of the DPC because the DPC is the structure that best understands the region's conditions (Isnanto, 2019b).

Rudy explained that the system for selecting candidates for mayor election that gave rise to the Purnomo and Teguh had long been in place. Jokowi and Ganjar Pranowo are also the results of screening at the lower level. When running for governor of Jakarta, Jokowi was captured by the PDIP's DPD of Jakarta, while Ganjar was captured by the PDIP's DPD of Central Java (Ricky, 2019). Rudy said that the DPP made a mistake if they continued to recommend names other than those proposed by the DPC of Surakarta. He even said the party would be finished if the DPP did not heed its internal rules (Ricky, 2019). Therefore, Rudy emphasized that would not change the DPC's decision to fight for the Purnomo -Teguh pair as the proposed candidates. He even said that he would take a firm stance if the PDIP's DPP made a recommendation to Gibran (CNBC, 2019).


The views of party officials at the DPC level differ from those of several DPPs. One of DPP's chairs, Ahmad Basarah, argued that the appointment of local government head candidates in his party was carried out through three channels, namely DPC, DPD, and DPP. Therefore, it is not surprising that PDIP then opened the registration of candidates for mayor of Surakarta at the DPD. Ahmad Basarah's opinion is similar to Puan Maharani's, the Chair of the Political and Security Affairs of the DPP PDIP. Apart from the DPC, according to Puan, PDIP still allows prospective candidates who want to run in the contest to register through the DPD and DPP (CNBC, 2019).

This view of the DPP was then formalized into a decree. The DPP subsequently decided that in selecting candidates for regional heads, PDIP opened registration through the DPD and DPP. The decision is contained in party decree No. 918/IN/DPP/XI/2019, dated November 21, 2019, regarding the Registration of Prospective Local Government Head Candidates for Simultaneous Local Government Head Elections in 2020. Local government head candidates must take registration forms through the DPD and DPP, not at the DPC (Insetyonoto, 2019). The registration of governor, mayor, and regent candidates through the party's DPD and DPP will occur from 25 to November 30, 2019. The DPP then issued decree no. 944/IN/DPP/XI/2019 explains that exceptions are related to the registration time at the Central Java Province PDIP DPD.

Unlike other regions, registration through the DPD is open from December 6 to 12, 2019. Also different from the DPC of Surakarta, the DPD of Central Java opened an open registration because it applies to every citizen (Insetyonoto, 2019). The registration of governor, mayor, and regent candidates through the party's DPD and the party's DPP will take place from 25 to 30 November 2019. The DPP then issued decree no. 944/IN/DPP/XI/2019 which explains that there are exceptions related to the registration time at the Central Java Province PDIP DPD. Unlike other regions,



registration through the DPD is open from December 6 to 12, 2019. Also different from the DPC of Surakarta, the DPD of Central Java opened an open registration, because it applies to every citizen (Insetyonoto, 2019).



**Figure 1.** Comparison between de jure and de facto of the recruitment process

According to Bambang Wuryanto, Head of the DPP PDIP's Electoral Winning Body and also the chair of DPD PDIP of Central Java, the consideration in opening the registration for Surakarta mayoral candidates at the DPD level is due to the existence of the PDIP in Central Java which is considered as very important ideologically (Insetyonoto, 2019). Central Java is the base of PDIP and is very strategic regarding party interests to win the 2024 election. Gibran then registered through the DPD of Central Java on December 12, 2019 (Putri, 2020).

The privilege for Gibran was not only realized by the opening of the registration of the Surakarta mayoral candidate through the party structure at the DPD PDIP of Central Java, although the process at the Surakarta PDIP DPC was declared completed. In party regulation Number 24 of 2017, other requirements contain 23 points, whereas, in point 12, it is stated that a Membership Card must prove cadres or party members who

run with the condition that they have been members for the last three consecutive years. While in point 13, it is explained that the cadres/members, as referred to in point 12, must attach a recommendation from the party management where the person concerned is domiciled (PDIP, 2017). This point can potentially hinder Gibran's efforts to advance in the contestation.

When registering through the DPD PDIP of Central Java, Gibran had only been a party member for less than three months. He was only officially registered as a PDIP member on September 23, 2019. In addition, Gibran did not receive a recommendation from the DPC PDIP of Surakarta because DPC had decided to appoint internal cadres according to party regulations. If viewed from this aspect, Gibran cannot fulfill the requirements to register as a candidate for mayor as previously determined. From this point, Gibran could not fulfill several administrative requirements, preventing him from continuing his political ambitions in Surakarta.

Nevertheless, this barrier then began to open. The DPP's elites stated that the administrative requirements in political parties are not rigid and must be fulfilled absolutely, so there is still an opportunity for someone to register even though administrative requirements are not met (Muchus, 2019). Bambang Wuryanto then explained that the membership issue was an administrative matter. He further said that the decision related to the election was based on political considerations, not administrative considerations. Thus, Gibran's membership duration in the PDIP is also not a big problem (Muchus, 2019). Moreover, particular matters that have a national impact, such as the decision to determine candidates in the regional head election, are the prerogative of the General Chair. Based on this explanation, Gibran was still allowed to participate in the candidate selection even though he could not fulfill all the administrative requirements determined by the party.

It must be said that before issuing the two-party regulations, Gibran had met Megawati in person in Jakarta on October 24, 2019. He was possibly lobbying or making a political move (Satria, 2019). IPO Executive Director Dedi Kurnia Syah called Gibran's meeting with Megawati and the PDIP DPP unethical. Gibran overstepped the DPC of Surakarta or the DPD of Central Java. Dedi said this move hurts the PDIP's political consolidation. Gibran's candidacy could cause PDIP discord (Budiman, 2020).

Nevertheless, both the DPP and the DPC of Surakarta agreed that who would contest the regional head election would be eventually determined by the general chairman of the party (Suryo & Aji, 2019). According to Secretary General of PDIP Hasto Kristiyanto, the party's DPP determined the candidate through an internal meeting. However, the right to determine the candidate rests entirely with the party chairman (Maharani, 2019). It is clear proof that the recruitment process in PDIP is still centralized.

The DPC's opposing attitude, even tends to be harsh on including Gibran in the Surakarta mayoral candidate recruitment process, provoked a DPP reaction. The DPP tried to soften the tough stance of the DPC by summoning the DPC's cadres to Jakarta. 36 PDIP cadres in Surakarta, especially the DPC PDIP officials and PDIP parliament members of the Surakarta local assembly, left for Jakarta on February 3, 2020. They were summoned to the DPP in order to consolidate the mayoral election that would take place in the city, which had experienced internal tension (Rafiq, 2020).

As a result of the dynamics of the recruitment process at PDIP, in the end, two names were sent to the DPP for recommendations, namely Achmad Purnomo, proposed by the PDIP's DPC of Surakarta, and Gibran Rakabuming, proposed by the Central Java

PDIP DPD. As previously predicted, the recommendation from the PDIP's DPP went to Gibran Rakabuming as mayor candidate and Teguh Prakosa as vice mayor candidate. Teguh Prakosa was the name prepared by the DPC PDIP of Surakarta to become Achmad Purnomo's partner.

Rico Marbun, the Executive Director of the National Survey Media (Median), said that the figure of President Jokowi was one of the primary considerations in giving PDIP recommendations to Gibran (Suwardi, 2021). Ujang Komaruddin, an observer from Al Azhar University, had predicted that the DPP's recommendation would go down on Gibran. According to him, this is due to Megawati's political calculations, that Gibran has a high chance of winning in the 2024 Surakarta mayoral election. According to Ujang, this immense opportunity is because Gibran is the son of Jokowi. Gibran also has all the resources to win. Ujang believed many powers would help Gibran win (VOI, 2020).

Karyono Wibowo, Executive Director of the Indonesia Public Institute, made a similar prediction. Gibran is increasingly popular and creates a political magnet through the support of parties outside the PDIP (Hasan & Fathan, 2020). Gibran's attractiveness makes PDIP have to calculate carefully. He is sure that in the end, PDIP will carry Gibran as a candidate for mayor of Surakarta. Therefore Megawati can provide recommendations without needing approval from the DPC (Sukmana & Arifianto, 2022). This finding differs from Kristiyanto and Hanief (2022), which state that the PDIP has transformed depersonalization.

As one of the pillars of democracy, political parties have an essential role. One of its most important functions is to become a bridge or channel for people's aspirations into the policy-making process at the government level. The form of channeling these aspirations is through an electoral process in which political parties fill public positions in government and representative institutions.

However, after observing the development of political parties in Indonesia, political parties expected to function optimally to accommodate and channel people's aspirations are still experiencing serious problems from an institutional perspective, namely the low internal institutionalization of political parties. What is meant by party institutionalization is the process of stabilizing political parties both in the form of behavior that forms a pattern and in attitudes or culture so that the party becomes more than just an organization (Randall & Svåsand, 2002).

The process of party institutionalization contains two aspects, namely internal-external and structural-attitudinal. From the combination of these two aspects, four dimensions are produced that can be used to measure the level of institutionalization of political parties, namely the degree of systemness, the degree of value infusion, the degree of decisional autonomy, and the degree of public knowledge (reification) of a political party (Randall & Svåsand, 2002). These four dimensions will be used to explain the causes of internal tensions experienced by PDIP in its political recruitment function.

**Table 5.** Dimensions of Party Institutionalization

	<b>Internal</b>	<b>External</b>
<b>Structural</b>	Systemness	Decisional autonomy
<b>Attitudinal</b>	Value infusion	reification

Source: Randall & Svåsand (2002)

Systemness indicates the degree of use of rules, requirements, procedures, and mechanisms agreed upon and stipulated in the constitution and party regulations in implementing party functions. It will be possible if the party can formulate the party constitution in a comprehensive and detailed manner to be used as a reference for members and administrators in carrying out all party functions. A party has been institutionalized if it functions according to the constitution and rules of the game (Randall & Svåsand, 2002).

The value infusion of a party is related to the party's relationship with certain populist groups, whether a party contains dimensions as a social movement supported by certain populist groups based on class and specific religious or ethnic communities. In addition, the degree of value identity is also shown by the influence of clientelism in the relationship between members and parties, whether they tend to be instrumentalist, where members always expect tangible resources from the party or are more ideological, where the relationship between the two is motivated by members' expectations that there is a match between party actions and party ideology (Suryo & Aji, 2019). A party can be institutionalized in terms of value identity if the party already has loyal supporters from a particular social base because of the pattern and direction of policies it is fighting for and if the support given to the party is due to its political orientation according to the party's ideology or platform (Randall & Svåsand, 2002).

The decisional autonomy of a party in making decisions is related to the party's relations with actors outside the party, both with political authority holders and with owners of sources of funds or mass support. The relationship pattern of a party with actors outside the party can be in the form of a relationship of dependence on external actors, interdependence, or a network that supports the party. A political party can have a high degree of autonomy if its decision is not dictated by outsiders but by themselves with or without consultation with outside actors who are partners or support networks. A party will have autonomy in making decisions if the funds to finance party activities come from member fees and contributions from administrators and activists outside of member fees (Randall & Svåsand, 2002).

Reification is determined by how strong the public's imagination of the party is and becomes a factor that shapes the behavior of political actors. A political party can be institutionalized in terms of public knowledge if the general public defines the figure and role of the political party according to the party's value identity (platform) so that the public can understand (though not necessarily agree) why a political party performs certain types of actions and does not perform other types of actions. Here it is necessary to make a clear distinction between knowing the figure and progress of a party as intended by the party and agreeing or disagreeing with the figure and progress of the party. A party's ability to establish itself depends, among other things, on its historical footprint and the symbolic values it represents. These two things are determined by the strength of the party's organization, particularly their ability to use effective communication methods (Randall & Svåsand, 2002).

Of the four dimensions described by Randall & Svasand above, the low degree of systemness and decisional autonomy that should be considered triggers the emergence of internal tensions within the PDIP in the recruitment process for Surakarta mayoral candidates. DPP's decision to change recruitment procedures in the middle of the recruitment process seems to show the low commitment of some party elites, especially elites at the central level, to obey the rules of the game. Instead of respecting the

recruitment process completed by the party structure at the local level, party elites at the mid-level tended to ignore the realities and political aspirations at the local level.

Moreover, the minimum duration of membership requirements for cadres who wish to register as local government head candidates stipulated in party regulations is considered merely administrative matters that party elites can overlook. By doing these things, the PDIP elite at the central level has betrayed their cadres at the local level, who have tried to carry out recruitment procedures optimally. Party elites' steps at the central level show the low degree of systemness within the PDIP.

Central party elites seem to be trying to separate administrative and political recruitment in their statements. In reality, administrative and political realms are intertwined. The administrative area related to PDIP registration for regional head recruitment is a political decision. The DPP's decision to rule out administrative issues in the Gibran case shows that the DPP elites' arguments to support Gibran are weak.

The low degree of systemness and the problems in recruiting the Surakarta mayoral candidate were also driven by the party's low decision-making autonomy. The party's decision at the central level to make new game rules to accommodate Gibran's desire to participate in the contest, even though the recruitment process at the local level had been completed, came after Gibran maneuvered to meet the PDIP general chairman, Megawati. Gibran's status as the son of the president promoted by PDIP is likely to have influenced the birth of new rules in the recruitment process (Gama et al., 2021; Salia & Wibowo, 2022; Setiajid & Susanti, 2022).

The policies that parties have taken at the central level have created internal tensions at the local level. Several DPC of Surakarta party cadres were disappointed and threatened to half-heartedly support Gibran if the party at the primary level gave its recommendation to Gibran. Fortunately, until the voting day, the Surakarta City PDIP was still relatively solid, even playing a significant role in Gibran's efforts to win the contest (Magfirani et al., 2019; Muhtadi & Nursiam, 2022). Although it does not directly affect the race for the mayoral seat of Surakarta, which PDIP followed, what had been done by party elites at the central level can set a negative precedent in the future

(Asrawijaya, 2022; Rahmat et al., 2022; Setiaji, 2022). The actions of the party elite at the central level can damage the confidence of the party structure at the local level in the seriousness of the party elite at the central level to enforce the rules (Kurniawan, 2017; Suwardi, 2021; Viani et al., 2017).

## CONCLUSION

Observations and studies of political parties during the reform era have revealed a long list of institutionalization problems, including internal tensions and conflicts in the succession of the general chairman, lack of regeneration, and oligarchic recruitment mechanisms. The PDIP's general chairman deciding who can run in regional elections shows an oligarchy in political recruitment. Even though it follows the game's rules, the DPP's disregard for the local party's election results shows high centralization in party management. These things indicate PDIP's institutional problems, especially in political recruitment.

The parties' institutional problems are a historical burden they must bear during reform. For three decades, political parties have been viewed more as a source of legitimacy for the ruling regime than as an intermediary between the state and society, making it difficult for them to develop democratically (Justwan et al., 2022). Moreover,

various New Order regime policies such as party fusion, party de-ideology, and floating mass made the party not have a mature and comprehensive tradition of partying.

One thousand nine hundred ninety-eight reforms changed this role. Political parties have become power-formers by incorporating their members into government. This drastic change in the role of a political party may have led to stuttering or indecision within the parties, affecting their ability to carry out essential functions (Justwan et al., 2022).

However, the weak degree of party institutionalization is not only a product of history. When the power struggle is still the primary orientation of parties in Indonesia, many political parties have not placed party institutionalization as a priority agenda. The climate of electoral competition in Indonesia, which is very thick with shades of patronage and clientelism, seems to be a separate disincentive for party elites to initiate serious party institutionalization efforts. The problems that arose in political recruitment carried out by PDIP in the 2020 Surakarta mayoral election, as described above, have become new evidence that complements previous findings that the institutional degree of political parties during the reformation period is still relatively weak. Two decades of reforms do not seem to have succeeded in significantly increasing the degree of institutionalization of political parties in Indonesia.

The limitations of this research have opened up opportunities for at least two different research agendas. First, the dependence of this research on documentary data and media news has certainly raised the issue of validity in this article. Therefore, more intensive research involving primary data is expected to overcome this problem.

Secondly, amid his father's unfinished term as president and inserted through a unique internal party recruitment mechanism, Gibran's entry into electoral politics has led to criticism of the increasing symptoms of political dynasties in Indonesia. The rise to power of political dynasties in regional Indonesia has been the subject of critical analysis, with most seeing the phenomenon as a symptom of the broader democratic shortcomings of the post-Suharto period (Aspinall & As'ad, 2016). What happened in the 2020 Surakarta mayoral election strengthens a situation in which Indonesian decentralization and electoral democracy have facilitated the emergence of what is loosely labeled as political dynasties (Savirani, 2016). Thus, it opens vast opportunities for studies on the relationship between the low degree of party institutionalization and the rise of political dynasties in Indonesia.

## REFERENCES

- Adelia, A. (2020). Implikasi sistemik dari rekrutmen kepala daerah oleh partai politik. *Journal of Islamic and Law Studies*, 4(1), 33–48. <http://jurnal.uin-antasari.ac.id/index.php/jils/article/view/33-48%0>
- Adhithia, F.B. (2019). Deretan Mantan Wali Kota Solo, dari Sindoeredjo hingga Jokowi. Retrieved From <https://www.idntimes.com/news/indonesia/fitang-adhithia/deretan-mantan-wali-kota-solo-dari-sindoeredjo-hingga-jokowi?page=all>
- Anggoro, T., Yani, Y. M., Setiabudi, W., & Muradi, M. (2020). Rekrutmen politik calon kepala daerah (Studi tentang seleksi kandidat pada partai amanat nasional pada pemilukada di kota tasikmalaya tahun 2017). *Jurnal Tapis: Jurnal Teropong Aspirasi Politik Islam*, 16(1), 95–106. <https://doi.org/10.24042/tps.v16i1.6125>
- Aspinall, E., & As'ad, M. U. (2016). *Understanding Family Politics: Successes and Failures*

- of Political Dynasties in Regional Indonesia. *South East Asia Research*, 24(3), 420–435. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X16659571>
- Asrawijaya, E. (2022). Peran Modal Sosial Jokowi Dalam Politik Kekerabatan: Studi Kasus Pada Pilkada 2020 di Surakarta dan Medan. *Jurnal PolGov*, 4(1), 1-32. <https://doi.org/10.22146/polgov.v4i1.3525>
- Budiman, A. (2020). Pencalonan Gibran Rakabuming Disebut Pertanda Buruk bagi PDIP, retrieved from <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1366233/pencalonan-gibran-rakabuming-disebut-pertanda-buruk-bagi-pdip>.
- CNBC (2019). Ibu Puan, Gibran Masih Boleh Jadi Cawalkot Solo Gak, Nih?. Retrieved from <https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/news/20191028124520-4-110623/ibu-puan-gibran-masih-boleh-jadi-cawalkot-solo-gak-nih>
- Cole, M. (2020). Us Election 2020 Alerts! Democracy Under Threat; Coronavirus Catastrophe; Climate Change Destruction; War. *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies*, 18(2), 70–118. <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85092234789&partnerID=40&md5=b642442e044b056c85891d20673e45d6>
- Dinarto, D., & Ng, J. (2021). Characterizing Independent Candidates in Indonesian Local Politics. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 40(2), 266–292. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103420972412>
- Eichenberger, R., Schafer, P., & Stadelmann, D. (2019). Making Public Infrastructure Work: Multi-Seat Majoritarian Elections as A New Institutional Approach. *Journal of Infrastructure, Policy, and Development*, 3(2 Special Issue), 244–260. <https://doi.org/10.24294/jipd.v3i2.1155>
- DPP PDIP (2019). Anggaran Dasar dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga PDIP
- DPP PDIP (2017). Party Regulation Number 24 of 2017 concerning the Selection and Recruitment of candidates for local government heads, deputy regional heads, candidates
- Fitriyah, F. (2020). Partai Politik, Rekrutmen Politik dan Pembentukan Dinasti Politik pada Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada). *Politika: Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, 11(1), 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.14710/politika.11.1.2020.1-17>
- Fossati, D. (2020). Electoral reform and partisan dealignment in Indonesia. *International Political Science Review*, 41(3), 349–364. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119826389>
- Gama, B., Sudardi, B., Abdullah, W., & . (2021). Construction of Self-Identity: “Blusukan” as the Strategy of Campaigning for Surakarta City Mayor Election. *Politika: Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, 12(2), 222-235. <https://doi.org/10.14710/politika.12.2.2021.222-235>
- Hakim, R. N. (2021). Perjalanan Gibran Jadi Walikota Solo: Berawal Dari Survei Hingga Disahkan. retrieved from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2021/01/22/11281161/perjalanan-gibran-jadi-wali-kota-solo-berawal-dari-survei-hingga-disahkan?page=all>.
- Hamid, A. (2014), Jokowi's Populism in the 2012 Jakarta Gubernatorial Election, in *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 33(1), 85–109. <https://doi.org/10.1177/186810341403300105>
- Hasan, I., & Fathan, F. (2020). Analisis Framing Berita Politik Menjelang Pilkada Klaten Tahun 2020 Pada Solopos. Com. *Academic Journal of Da'wa and Communication*, 1(2),

- 479–500. <https://doi.org/10.22515/ajdc.v1i2.2726>
- <https://kota-surakarta.kpu.go.id/>
- Insetyonoto. (2019). Pilkada 2020 PDIP Jateng Buka Pendaftaran. Retrieved from <https://www.gatra.com/detail/news/459003/politik/pilkada-2020-desember-pdip-jateng-buka-pendaftaran>
- Isnanto, B. A. (2019a). Cerita Purnomo Diberi Tahu Jokowi Rekomendasi Pilkada Solo Jatuh ke Gibran. Retrieved from. <https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-tengah/d-5096713/cerita-purnomo-diberi-tahu-jokowi-rekomendasi-pilkada-solo-jatuh-ke-gibran/2>
- Isnanto, B. A. (2019b). Peluang Gibran Cawalkot Solo Lewat PDIP Sudah Tertutup. Retrieved from <https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-tengah/d-4717921/fx-rudy-peluang-gibran-cawalkot-solo-lewat-pdip-sudah-tertutup>
- Justwan, F., Baumgaertner, B., & Curtright, M. (2022). Meddling in the 2016 Elections and Satisfaction With Democracy in the US. *Political Studies*, 1-22. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217221126300>
- Kristiyanto, H. & Hanief, A. (2022). Ideological Strengthening. Strategic Leadership and Depersonalization: The Transformation of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle 1999-2019. *Cosmogov*, 8(1), 46-63. <https://doi.org/10.24198/cosmogov.v8i1.38447>
- Kurniawan, D. A. (2017). ... *Sumber Informasi Tentang Pilkada Serentak 2015 dan Jenis Kelamin dengan Partisipasi Politik Di Kalangan Mahasiswa FISIP Universitas Sebelas Maret Surakarta. Skripsi: Universitas Sebelas Maret Surakarta*
- Maghfirani, A. S., Condro, H. D., & Triono, S. P. (2019). *Analisis Reaksi Pasar Modal di Jakarta Islamic Index (Jii) Sebelum Dan Sesudah Pilkada Dki Jakarta 2017*. core.ac.uk. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/296477884.pdf>
- Maharani, T. (2019). PDIP Syaratkan Jadi Kader 3 Tahun Untuk Maju Pilkada, Bagaimana Nasib Gibran. Retrieved from <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2019/12/23/15424671/pdi-p-syaratkan-jadi-kader-3-tahun-untuk-maju-pilkada-bagaimana-nasib-gibran>
- Marwoto, B. D. (2020). KPU Surakarta tetapkan 418283 DPT Pilkada 2020. Retrieved from <https://www.antaranews.com/berita/1783385/kpu-surakarta-tetapkan-418283-dpt-pilkada-2020>
- Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M. and Saldana, J. (2014). *Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook*. London : Sage.
- Muchus, B. R. (2019). Syarat 3 Tahun Jadi Kader Hambat Gibran, PDIP: Keputusan di Bu Mega. Retrieved from <https://news.detik.com/berita-jawa-tengah/d-4826522/syarat-3-tahun-jadi-kader-hambat-gibran-pdip-keputusan-di-bu-mega>
- Muhtadi, I., & Nursiam, A. (2022). *Analisis Reaksi Pasar Modal Terhadap Peristiwa Pemilihan Kepala Daerah (Pilkada) Serentak Tahun 2020*. eprints.ums.ac.id. <http://eprints.ums.ac.id/id/eprint/96623>
- Nim, J. (2018). Rekrutmen Partai Golkar Dalam Penetapan Calon Walikota dan Wakil Walikota Pontianak Tahun 2018. *ASPIRASI-Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, 8(4). <https://dx.doi.org/10.26418%2F2550>



- Persada, S. (2019). Survei Unsri Walikota Solo: Popularitas Gibran Kaesang Tinggi. *Tempo*. Retrieved from <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1228759/survei-unsri-wali-kota-solo-popularitas-gibran-kaesang-tinggi>
- Putri, B. U. (2020). Lika-Liku Gibran Jokowi Hingga Dicalonkan PDIP di Pilkada Solo. *Tempo*. <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1366182/lika-liku-gibran-jokowi-hingga-dicalonkan-pdip-di-pilkada-solo>
- Rafiq, A. (2019). Pilkada Surakarta 2020, PDIP Tidak Memerlukan Koalisi, diambil dari <https://nasional.tempo.co/read/1272626/pilkada-surakarta-2020-pdip-tidak-memerlukan-koalisi>
- Rahmat, D., Haryanto, A. T., & ... (2022). Performance of the Election Supervisory Agency in implementing the 2020 Surakarta City Election. *East Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Research*, 1(6), 1183–1194. <https://doi.org/10.55927/eajmr.v1i6.769>
- Randall, V., & Svasand, L. (2002). Party Institutionalization in New Democracies. *Party Politics*, 8, 5-26. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068802008001001>
- Ricky, M. (2019). Rudy Sebut PDIP Langgar Aturan jika Rekomendasikan Gibran. *Solopos*. <https://www.solopos.com/pilkada-solo-rudy-sebut-dpp-pdip-langgar-aturan-jika-rekomendasikan-gibran-1030288>
- Salia, F. N., & Wibowo, P. (2022). Ada Apa Dengan Faktor Kepemimpinan Dalam Peningkatan Kualitas Laporan Keuangan Pemerintah Daerah Eks Karesidenan Surakarta?. *Jurnal Ilmiah Akuntansi Fakultas Ekonomi*, 8(1), 63-88. <https://doi.org/10.34204/jiafe.v8i1.4893>
- Satria, J. N. (2019). Gibran Temui Megawati, Lobi Soal Pilwalkot Solo? retrieved from <https://news.detik.com/berita/d-4758108/gibran-temui-megawati-lobi-soal-pilwalkot-solo>
- Savirani, A. (2016). Survival Against the Odds: The Djunaid family of Pekalongan, Central Java. *South East Asia Research*, 24(3), 407–419. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26372043>
- Setiaji, S. T. A. (2022). *Ekonomi Politik Media Dalam Pemberitaan Calon Perseorangan Bagyo Wahyono-Fx Suparjo di Pilkada Kota Surakarta 2020 (Analisis Wacana Kritis Norman Fairclough pada Koran Solopos & Radar Solo)*. Skripsi: Universitas Mercubuana. <https://repository.mercubuana.ac.id/69531/>
- Setiajid, S., & Susanti, M. H. (2022). Budaya Blusukan Dan Familisme Dalam Demokrasi Lokal (Studi Pemilihan Walikota Surakarta Tahun 2020). *Konservasi Pendidikan*. <https://bookchapter.unnes.ac.id/index.php/kp/article/view/52>
- Sukmana, H. S. A., & Arifianto, B. D. (2022). Representasi Gerakan Politik Identitas Islam dalam Film “Sepanjang Jalan Satu Arah.” *Jurnal Audiens*, 3(1), 31-47. <https://doi.org/10.18196/jas.v3i1.11762>
- Sunaryo, A. (2019). PDIP Buat Aturan Pendaftaran Calon Kepala Daerah melalui DPD dan DPP FX Rudy Heran. *Merdeka*. <https://www.merdeka.com/politik/pdip-buat-aturan-pendaftaran-calon-kepala-daerah-melalui-dpd-dan-dpp-fx-rudy-heran.html>
- Suryo, H., & Aji, H. K. (2019). Komunikasi Politik Pasangan Calon Pdp Pada Alat Peraga Kampanye Baliho Pada Pilkada 2015 di Wilayah Eks Karesidenan Surakarta. *Research Fair UNISRI*, 3(1),506-513. <https://doi.org/10.33061/rsfu.v3i1.2612>

- Suwardi, A. C. (2021). The Effect of Television Debate on Electoral Political Perception And Attitude To Local Leader Election: A Case Study In Surakarta City, Central Java, Indonesia. *Multicultural Education*.
- Viani, A. N., Santoso, B., & Sos, S. (2017). *Tingkat Partisipasi Politik Remaja dalam Pilkada Serentak 2015 pada Mahasiswa Fakultas Ilmu Komunikasi dan Informatika Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta*. Skripsi:Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta. [eprints.ums.ac.id](http://eprints.ums.ac.id). <http://eprints.ums.ac.id/id/eprint/49543>
- VOI, R. (2020). Menerka Langkah Gibran dan PDIP di Pilkada Solo 2020. Retrieved from <https://voi.id/bernas/1063/menerka-langkah-gibran-dan-pdip-di-pilkada-solo-2020>