



Pancasila Values and Peace Verses as Resilience Against the Religious Extremism: Studies to Nahdlatul Ulama and Shi'a

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Article Info	Abstract
<p>Article History</p> <p>Received: March 20, 2024</p> <p>Revised: May 2, 2024</p> <p>Accepted: June 1, 2024</p> <p>Published: June 20, 2024</p> <p>Keyword: Identity, Ideology, Contestation, Peace, Terrorism</p>	<p>The article explains the contestation and commodification of ideology in changing patterns of extremist movements in society. Ideological problems are studied using a political sociology approach to describe the relationship between Pancasila values and peaceful verses in Islam with the phenomenon of changing movement patterns of terrorist networks in Indonesia. This paper uses a qualitative method that explains the data descriptively so that the construction of the data is understood as the result of interpretations that have plural dimensions or depend on the analytical point of view. The primary sources for this research are documents related to the themes of Pancasila values and peaceful verses in the Koran and patterns of building immunity against extremism. The data processing process based on some documents was carried out using the content analysis method using the descriptive analysis method. Ideological identity in contestation in Indonesia is only one of the differentiation strategies to win public sympathy. Identity politics, which is often associated with radicalism and fighting between religious groups, is different from what happens in politics in other countries. The phenomenon of the life of the Nahdlatul Ulama and Shi'a community in Jepara, which tends to be peaceful and quick in resolving conflicts based on religious ideology, is at least influenced by awareness of the values of Pancasila as a common consensus.</p>
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Introduction

The relationship between the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and the Shi'i in harmony and peaceful religion in Jepara has a unique religious appearance. The differences in sects that have led to the politics of hatred between Sunni-Shi'i in some regions of the world have had no impact on the atmosphere of religious freedom in Jepara. The religious politics that developed in Jepara society were pluralistic due to the intersection of the arrival of the nation's children. Commitment to the values of awareness and humanity, as the substance of Pancasila, is at least the foundation for harmonizing religious life (Badrun et al., 2023). The reality of the obstacle to inter-religious harmony in Jepara, such as relations between NU and Shi'i or Islam, Christianity, and Buddhism, is the influx of electoral political sentiment.

The development of the democratization journey in the reform era is experiencing new challenges in line with the strengthening of mainstream politics in implementing elections. The study of sectarian politics in Indonesia began with Clifford Geertz, who introduced the sociological concept of the trichotomy of Javanese society, mainly *santri* (Islamic students), *priyayi* (noblemen), and *abangan* (a group of Muslim Javanese people who practice Islam in various sects, such as Hinduism, Buddhism, and animism) (Budi, 2022). Some circles consider the strengthening of mainstream politics, which has transformed into identity politics to occur in the 2012 DKI Jakarta regional head election, continued in the 2014 presidential election and 2017-2018 regional elections, and experienced duplication in the 2019 presidential election contestation. Ultimately, it will have a systemic impact until the implementation stage of the 2024 presidential election.

General elections (elections) are one of the political instruments that are considered the best in ensuring the progress of a nation's democratization process. Elections are evidence of community sovereignty in recruiting and providing power and leadership through a representative system. Democracy has the characteristic of inclusiveness, giving every individual the right to vote directly are elected (Khamdan, 2022). Thus, elections allow everyone to participate in all political processes, namely planning decision-making, implementing policy results, and evaluating political policies.

Democratic practices that run in Indonesia at all levels are still dominated by transactional practices (Ashar et al., 2020). The institutional design of elections through an open proportional system further strengthens the existence of personal contestation, which enlivens vote-buying and selling transactions. The public views that giving money to elect candidates or contests is normal and has become its culture. Contestation between candidates within internal parties is getting tighter, so competition with other political parties is getting tougher. Transactional practices have at least the impact of weakening the struggle for rights, decreasing the promotion of diversity and inclusion in political policymaking, and strengthening the use of state instruments to suppress some citizens with different political identities.

Identity is identifying and unifying certain signs and symbols to become one self-concept to identify differences with other parties. Therefore, identity becomes an attribute that differs between friends and enemies because of shared interests (Haas, 2021). A person's identity, for example, certainly cannot be separated from self-awareness in the

process of collectivistic relations. Certain individuals and collective groups can create new identities and reproduce old identities for others through the labeling process. Giving an identity to another person or choosing one's identity is a dynamic practice based on external factors (Khamdan, 2018).

The polarization of social groups, as in the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections and the 2017-2018 regional elections, has influenced the mobilization of support based on identity commodification. The condition of democracy in Indonesia has become a concern of the international community because it is one of the largest democratic countries. Indonesia, with its vast territory inhabited by a large population, the majority of whom are Muslims, is certainly interesting in understanding the relationship between democracy and religion itself. This reality opens opportunities for transnational activism to take place in Indonesia. Transnational activism is an international relations process that no longer views the state as the main actor. Still, everyone, group, or non-governmental party can build international relations interactions (Porta, 2021).

Group polarization in electoral politics in Indonesia in 2024 has already developed in the social media space. Communities create their own public spaces to be used together to express themselves without limitations. This awareness gave rise to presidential election contestants using social media, such as Anies Baswedan as a presidential candidate and Mahfud MD as a vice-presidential candidate, to use live TikTok. Social media allows anyone to articulate their aspirations and interests, whether economic, social, cultural, political, or consolidated, for action against authoritarian forces (Finnemore & Jurkovich, 2020). Social media can support the democratic process because democratization is a struggle for public support.

Social media is very effective in leading or framing news and political communication. Very fast accessibility is at least the strategy of choice for many political contestants with weaknesses in funding resources. Social media quickly and massively spreads ideas and criticizes political policies for electoral purposes. Social media, which includes YouTube, Instagram, Facebook, WhatsApp, X/Twitter, and other applications, has given rise to a new social class that is more familiar as media for movements for change. The latest social class based on social media has at least raised awareness about substantial democracy, namely respecting citizens' rights and the state's obligations towards citizens (Zainuddin et al., 2022). Movements that aim for substantial democracy often experience clashes between groups that continue to power and groups that seek change.

Identity in political contestation is often used as a framing tool for social movements. Consequently, political contestation tends to give rise to intolerance and radicalism. The growing identity sentiment in Indonesia is influenced by the majority feeling like a minority (Fulginiti et al., 2020). The reality of the defeat of Islamic parties or political parties with an Islamic mass base in every national election has had an impact on the strengthening of several Islamic groups in several regions. The relationship between religion and politics is often an issue when implementing the democratic process. The defeat of parties based on Muslim voters in the reform era in the 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014, and 2019 elections at least confirmed the perception that Muslims, as majority citizens, felt like they were a minority group in power.

Mobilizing social movements accompanied by the commodification of identity usually concerns issues of social inequality, injustice, and religious conflicts with political policies. These issues are at least part of the factors causing the development of jihadist groups in the diaspora with world radicalism networks (Khamdan, 2015). Conditions of inequality and injustice that occur on a local, regional, and international scale have triggered radical social movements for change. Radicalism, which is influenced by religious doctrine, gives rise to the global ideology of jihad, for example, carrying out acts of resistance because of anxiety about a sense of injustice or despair due to a feeling of being disrespected (Driss, 2020). The problem of economic inequality is very easy to use as material for mobilization propaganda and to exploit society so that identity politics becomes stronger in society.

Radical stigma given to individuals and group entities accompanied by hate speech and political intolerance is a form of identity construction. Stigma, carried out by building negative perceptions or stereotypes, is a mobilization strategy and mechanism for identifying friends with opponents. Stereotypes give rise to negative emotional reactions, which impact efforts to eliminate them, better known as discrimination (Portmann, 2022). Discriminatory bias can be understood through questions about whether a Muslim object to voting for a non-Muslim political contestant or, conversely, whether a non-Muslim objects to voting for a Muslim political contestant. This statement is the same as the relationship between NU as a Sunni representative and Shi'i, who are often positioned as a minority.

The main factor in which someone can commit acts of violence and even become an extremist sectarian is the drive for political or power conflict. Political problems at least involve issues of injustice, social inequality, and the inability of the authorities to reconcile the ideas of nationalism with Islamic political thought. Dissatisfaction with the failure to realize prosperity locally, regionally, and internationally has encouraged the birth of radical movements to change certain political systems (Tabroni & Idham, 2023). Ironically, the relationship between Sunnis and Shi'is in the process of struggle for political power often colors identity-based conflicts in some regions of the world, such as Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Pakistan.

Identity politics in contesting power tends to be based on shared interests and the ability to identify common enemies. Political democracy that is not balanced with economic democratic practices based on human values and problem values is vulnerable to giving rise to manipulative democracy that strengthens political oligarchy (Prajoko et al., 2024). As political financiers, oligarchs are very interested in playing with identity sentiments to cover economic interests in the political process. Oligarchs are power holders who can mobilize based on wealth and power, strengthening political dynasties at each power level. In this position, it is important to rediscover the noble values of Pancasila so that a peaceful atmosphere is maintained by mainstreaming peace-building.

Research Method

This article examines the theoretical study of Pancasila values in commodifying identity and ideological contestation in changing patterns of extremist movements. The phenomenon of utilizing political identity and the contestation process is often

accompanied by violent practices and radical labeling that distance itself from the values of Pancasila. This paper uses a qualitative research model with political psychology and sociology approaches to understand the phenomenon of religious behavior in the NU and Shi'a communities in Jepara. Therefore, using qualitative methods explains the data descriptively so that the construction of the data is understood as the result of interpretations that have plural dimensions or depend on the analytical point of view.

The primary source for this article is the socio-religious interaction between the Nahdlatul Ulama community and the Shi'a community in Jepara, Central Java. This social interaction was observed based on the themes of Pancasila values, the commodification of identity, and political contestation in changing patterns of extremist movements. The data processing process was based on the interaction of the two NU and Shi'ah Muslim communities using descriptive analytic methods. This method is carried out in several stages, describing, comparing, categorizing, and connecting the relationship between data and another.

Result and Discussion

Commodification of Indonesian Religious and Political Identity

The use of identity for political issues in Indonesia has at least many factors in its emergence. Identity as a commodity can describe how a particular symbol is constructed to accumulate power or control over a social mass base. The commodification of identity represents the transformation of symbols concerning the struggle for hegemony or power, identity as a symbol of resistance, identity as an effort to restore labeling, and identity to foster a unified sense of finding a common enemy.

The identity position of the majority often places minorities as parties who must participate or must be excluded (Burdah, 2023). The majority versus minority label occurs at least in several discriminatory conflicts between Sunnis and Shi'i, including in Indonesia. The acts of violence experienced by the Shi'i community in Sampang Madura and Bangil Pasuruan in the 2010-2013 period were at least related to the escalation of transnational conflict. The harmonious condition of the Sunni and Shi'i Muslim communities in Jepara finally found a point of uniqueness because the practice of Islam was more tolerant and able to infiltrate various ways of interacting with the Muslim community in Jepara (Saefudin, 2021).

The ideological contestation between Sunni and Shi'i occurred before the formation of Indonesia. Until the 19th century, the term Indonesia was not known internationally. The archipelago, which later became known as Indonesia today, was a collection of kingdoms or sultanates that were partly controlled by colonialists from the Portuguese Catholic Kingdom, the Dutch Protestant Kingdom, the French-Dutch Catholic Empire, the British Anglican Christian Kingdom, until Dutch rule returned to power, and ended in colonialism. Japanese Shinto Empire. The separate regional identities of each island, tribe, and form of kingdom create many flags and many other identities. This diversity of identities ultimately found a common consensus to build a new identity called the Indonesian nation.

The political contestation developing in Indonesia is not based on differences in religious sects but on national ideology and Islamism. The relationship between

religion and the state, which forms the relationship between separation and integration, ultimately gave rise to the paradigm of the Indonesian state as a secular state or a religious state (Khamdan, 2016b). Polarization arises from the existence of some people who get Western-style education opportunities and some people who only get local, indigenous education. Marginalization and solidarity with the injustice experienced by indigenous Muslims in Dutch ethical politics influenced the construction of resistance from santri and ulama by strengthening Islamic boarding schools as a basis for struggle.

The institutionalization of the Islamic boarding school-based network of Sunni ulama, led by Kyai Hasyim Asy'ari, gave rise to the founding of Nahdlatul Ulama on January 31, 1931. Previously, Sudarno Nadi, who was a wandering student from Laweyan Surakarta and later better known as Haji Samanhudi, founded the Islamic Trade Syarikat organization (SDI) on October 16, 1905. A year into its existence, SDI changed its name to Sarekat Islam by mandating Haji Oemar Said (HOS) Tjokroaminoto as chairman on September 10, 1912, to take care of the recognition and ratification of legal entities from the Dutch East Indies Government (Adnan, 2023).

H.O.S Tjokroaminoto's house in Surabaya is home to several MULO (Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs) students at junior high school level and HBS (Hogere Burgerlijk Schools) at high school level. Several remaining students included Sukarno, Munawar Musso, Kartosoewiryo, Alimin, Semaun, Darsono, and Abikoesno Tjokrosujoso. The construction of national identity and resistance to colonialism occurred in Tjokroaminoto's house, which was used as the headquarters of Sarekat Islam (Siregar et al., 2022). Several students who received ideological doctrine from Tjokroaminoto's house and at the same time received Dutch-style education became the axis of the Indonesian national identity movement in the following period.

The ulama, who did not have access to the Dutch education model and chose cultural resistance through the Islamic boarding school social movement, finally crystallized the political goal of achieving an independent Indonesia. The Indonesian A'la Islamic Council (MIAI), which was founded in 1937, became a federated organization accommodating the first 13 Islamic organizations in Indonesia at that time, namely Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, Al-Irsyad, Islamic Union (Persis), Indonesian Sarekat Islam Party (PSII), Indonesian Arab Party, Al-Khoiriyah, Indonesian Ulama Association (PUI), Indonesian Islamic Party (PII), Jong Islamieten Bond (JIB), Al-Hidayatul Islamiyah, Al-Ittihadiyah Islamiyah, All Aceh Ulama Association (PUSA). The formation of the MIAI Federation of Muslim Organizations effectively stopped Dutch efforts to divide fellow ulama and Islamic organizations in the Dutch East Indies region.

During the Japanese colonial period, the federation of Islamic organizations was facilitated into the Majelis Shura Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi) in November 1943. At the same time, Japan approached nationalist groups through the formation of the People's Worship Association, or Djawa Hokokai, on March 1, 1944 (Miftahuddin & Widiyanta, 2021). Sukarno symbolically became chairman of Hokokai, which in September 1944 formed a wing organization called Suishintai or Pioneer Front. Hokokai recruits young people from all social strata and ethnic origins, whether native, Chinese, Arab, or other mixtures. Figures in the Pioneer Front include Dr. Muwardi, RP. Suroso, and Otto Iskandardinata (Kahin, 1972). The *Barisan Pelopor* organization in the post-independence

period was known as *Barisan Banteng*.

Educational position, aristocratic or popular social strata, geographical aspects, and the political policies of those in power ultimately influence the formation of the collective identity of the national movement. The formation of the collective identity of each organization encourages political contestation and intellectual debate in the public sphere, especially among members of the Investigation Agency for Independence Preparatory Efforts (BPUPKI). The contestation and struggle for discourse about ideology or the basis for state formation in BPUPKI sessions is a continuation of the collective identity of movement organizations from Dutch colonialism until the end of Japanese colonialism.

The differences in political ideology and social construction of each member can ultimately be united into the basis of the Indonesian state called Pancasila. The use of the term Pancasila was Sukarno's idea as stated in his speech on June 1 1945. At the end of the first BPUPKI session, it was agreed to form a small committee tasked with identifying proposals and basic needs for establishing a state. The small committee was comprised of eight people: Ki Bagus Hadikusumo and KH—Abdul Wahid Hasyim, who was a representative of the Islamic group, and Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, AA. Maramis, Sutarjo Tjokroadisuryo Kartohadikusumo, and Otto Iskandardinata as representatives of national groups (Latif, 2011).

The small committee led by Sukarno changed the composition of its members to nine people. There are 4 Islamic groups, namely KH. Abdul Wahid Hasyim, KH. Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, Haji Agus Salim, and Abikoeso Tjokrosujoso. The national group comprises 5 people: Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, Muhammad Yamin, and AA. Maramis, and R. Ahmad Subarjo. The Committee of Nine formulated and approved the draft Preamble to the Constitution (UUD), signed on June 22, 1945. Muhammad Yamin called the document the "Jakarta Charter." Fatahillah's role historically influenced the name Jakarta in the liberation of Sunda Kelapa on June 22, 1527.

After independence on August 17, 1945, several Islamic organization figures were not accommodated in the implementation structure of the first regional government that was formed. The eight governors appointed by the President for the first time emphasized the dominance of secular nationalist or religiously neutral groups. The existence of the Indonesian National Party (PNI) on August 22, 1945, through the third PPKI session, the state leadership wanted to make it the only party in Indonesia. The decision regarding a single party led by Sukarno with PPKI's blessing can be understood because most PPKI members are secular nationalist groups.

The role of the Shi'i community was not yet clearly visible in the movement to gain independence or in the early stages of Indonesian independence. Sunni dominance in Indonesia, driven by Nahdlatul Ulama, has made the Shi'i community prefer the path of thought and education rather than state political constellations. The Shi'i community's choice of attitude is known as the step of openly hiding their identity or *taqiyyah* (Abubakar, 2020). The development of the Shi'i community in Indonesia is at least linked to the establishment the Islamic Boarding School Foundation (YAPI) in Bangil, Pasuruan, East Java, in 1976 by Husein Al-Habsyi. The development of the Shi'i community in East Java coincided with the emergence of a non-political Shi'i community in Jepara through

the Al-Khairat Islamic boarding school led by Abdul Qadir Bafaqih in Banjaran, Bangsri, in 1982.

The formation of symbolic identity and collective action of resistance in public spaces is strongly influenced by marginalization and political exile or alienation processes. Alienation can be felt by some people in the face of power dominance, such as the Shi'i community in Indonesia. Community groups outside those holding power will experience various forms of political alienation, such as loss of connection, participation, and control in social processes. Political dynamics characterized by the commodification of identity ultimately give rise to resistance efforts to reduce dominance or power. The cultural resistance of the Shi'ite community in Indonesia and Jepara further shows the existence of a new identity, namely the Shi'ite people who adhere to the Shafi'i sect.

Ideological Contestation and Patterns of Terrorist Movements

Democratization in Indonesia is a paradox related to identity stigma. Democratization can be a space for accepting some differences into a mutually accommodating unity, but it can also generate rejection of minorities who do not have the power of identity existence. The reform era in Indonesia is still characterized by anti-minority movements, as experienced by the Shi'i community through the framing of anti-Shi'i as a heretical sect and a source of conflict for Muslims (Zulkifli, 2024).

The era of reform, which guarantees freedom of association and assembly, has, on the one hand, created a situation of cross-ideological contestation. Radical thinking as a form of struggle to uphold Islamic law and establish an Islamic state in Indonesia, which was once considered politically defeated, is increasingly becoming stronger (Khamdan, 2016a). At the beginning of the emergence of reform, organizations increasingly flourished with their violent actions in the name of religion, such as Laskar Jundullah, the Islamic Defenders Front, Laskar Jihad, and the Indonesian Muslim Brotherhood.

The development of democratization in Indonesia has made it easier for Jemaah Islamiyah activists to carry out acts of terror, especially since there is a fatwa from an alliance of international mujahideen organizations that allows or legalizes attacks on civilians, especially citizens of the United States. The fatwa, as a statement of jihad and revenge against Jews and Crusaders, was signed by Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, along with four other mujahideen alliance figures on February 23, 1998 (Buciu, 2021). The four mujahideen alliances consist of Ayman Al Zawahiri representing the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Abu Yasir Rifai Ahmad Taha representing the Egyptian Al-Jami'ah Al-Islamiyah, Syaikh Mir Hamzah representing the Pakistani Jami'atul Ulama, and Fazlur Rahman representing the Bangladeshi Islamic Jihad Harakatul. The 1998 mujahideen alliance fatwa was obeyed by at least some of the mujahideen networks belonging to Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia.

The relationship between the fatwa and the phenomenon of violent extremism in Indonesia is marked by the terrorist activity of bombing 15 churches in several regions in Indonesia on Christmas Eve 2000. At least 20 people were killed, 35 people were seriously injured, and 48 had minor injuries. Such terror operations are very well planned and fall into the category of military operations by the Al-Qaeda and Jama'ah Islamiyah networks in Indonesia. The embryo of revenge by some members of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) Southeast Asia against the US and its allies outside the war area, marked

by the Bali Bombing I, which killed 202 people from 22 countries.

The Bali Bombing Terror I was commanded by Mukhlas alias Ali Ghufron, the leader of Mantiqi I or JI's regional region I, namely the Singapore and Malaysia regions. Mantiqi I members tended to follow the central Markaziyah warlord Hambali's direction. This attitude impacted differences between Abu Bakar Ba'asyir as Amir JI and 3 other Mantiqi responding to Osama's jihad fatwa. Mantiqi II, led by Abu Irsyad alias Syahroni, has regional areas in Java and Sumatra. Mantiqi III, led by Nasir Abbas, has regional regions of Sabah, Kalimantan, Eastern Indonesia, and the Philippines. Meanwhile, Mantiqi IV was led by Abdurrahim Ayub with the Australian regional region (Khamdan, 2024).

Indonesian security forces were able to reveal the perpetrators of the Bali Bombing I by releasing three sketches of the perpetrators' faces on October 30, 2002. Amrozi bin Nur Hasyim, one of the main suspects, was arrested in Tenggulun village, Lamongan, East Java, on November 5, 2002. The success of Amrozi's arrest was accompanied by the arrest of 10 other suspects simultaneously from several areas, on suspicion of assisting in the planning and execution of the explosion. The main perpetrators of the Bali Bomb I were arrested close to each other. Namely, Imam Samudra was caught on November 17, 2002, in Banten, Mukhlas alias Ali Ghufron, who was Amrozi's older brother, was caught with his younger brother, Ali Imron, on December 3, 2002, in Klaten. Amrozi, Imam Samudera, and Mukhlas received the death penalty in October 2003.

Hambali, who was the action mentor for the Mantiqi I mujahideen members, was caught in a joint anti-terror operation in Thailand in August 2003. Noordin M Top and dr continued Mantiqi's leadership. Azahari Husin demonstrated his existence through the bombing of the JW Marriot Hotel in August 2003. The terror killed 11 people, and more than 152 people suffered traumatic injuries due to the terror. The terror attraction of the JI network continued with the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Patra Kuningan, South Jakarta, on September 9, 2004, which became known as the Kuningan Bomb.

Anti-Terror Densus 88 succeeded in arresting Dr. Azhari during the siege in Batu, Malang, on November 9, 2005. An attempt at revenge was carried out by Noordin M Top and his network by bombing two hotels part of the United States hotel chain in Jakarta, namely the JW Marriot Hotel and the Ritz Carlton Hotel. The terrorist bombing of the two hotels occurred on July 17, 2009, or nine days after the 2009 presidential election voting. Densus 88 succeeded in arresting Noordin M Top in a raid on September 17, 2009, in Mojosongo, Solo, who was shot dead. The arrest of Dr. Azhari and Noordin M Top created disbanded terrorist network cells. It gave rise to a transformation in the pattern of the terror movement by attacking government officials.

Dulmatin, as a member of the Mantiqi I network, took over command and was able to mobilize several terrorist cells. The mobilization was created as a kind of reunion of Afghan mujahideen alums by holding military training in Bukit Janto, Aceh, since mid-2009. This cross-group paramilitary training or *tanzim* involves involvement with bomb assembly experts and JI training field commanders named Umar Patek, Abu Tholut, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, and Abdullah Sunata. The training initiated by Dulmatin targeted the establishment of Tanzim Al-Qaeda Serambi Makkah so that it would be considered equal to Al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden (Fitriani, 2018). The militias that were successfully united were JI, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), the Dulmatin network, the Banten group as the West Java Darul Islam faction, the DI faction commanded by Enceng

Kurnia, the former NII, the KOMPAK mujahideen part of the DI Sulawesi faction, the Lampung mujahideen, and other *mujahideen* factions.

Security forces succeeded in uncovering the integration of terrorist cells and paramilitary training in Aceh on February 22, 2010. Dulmatin was shot dead in an ambush at an internet cafe in Pamulang, South Tangerang, on March 9, 2010. In another position, Umar Patek was an assembly instructor bombs and the highest level after Dulmatin was captured alive in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on January 25, 2011. Osama bin Laden was captured several months later by American troops in Abbottabad on May 2, 2011 (Khamdan, 2024).

The disclosure and failure of terrorist paramilitary training in Aceh, the death of Dulmatin, and the arrest of Umar Patek resulted in the terrorist network in Indonesia becoming increasingly scattered into small cells. Network cell members in western Indonesia, such as Lampung, Banten, Jabodetabek, and West Java, founded Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB), led by Abu Roban. A network cell in eastern Indonesia founded Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT), led by Santoso in 2012. The main target of the post-Dulmatin terror generation turned into small terror attacks on security forces or civil society who interacted with the police.

The choice of values that a person or group believes in and fights for has formed a collective identity with political articulations and symbols. Identity as a political commodity or power is a series of social constructions that accumulate into a movement supported by multimodal aspects such as hashtags and images on social media (Achfandhy et al., 2024). The commodification of identity politics and the contestation of radical ideology illustrate the relationship between the struggle for hegemony or power, resistance, restoration of identity, and the discovery of common enemies. This commodification is influenced by identity stigma and the role of resource power holders and political power in mobilizing.

After the 2019 Presidential Election, for example, the distribution of areas where the pair opposing the government won were considered religious hardline areas. The statement was made by Mahfud MD on April 29, 2019, responding to efforts to reconcile the two couples contesting the presidential election. The hardline province is intended to categorize people with Islamic fanaticism in defending religion. West Java once developed the Indonesian Islamic State (NII) through the DI/TII movement, which Aceh and South Sulawesi followed. Several areas that are framed as radical are also considered areas for the entry and spread of Shi'i ideology.

The four provinces, Prabowo's support base, have similar cultural characteristics. The Sundanese, Acehnese, Minang, and Bugis people, as the majority ethnic groups in their region, at least have an assessment of candidates based on character, religion, and cultural history. Even though the different pairs for the 2019 presidential election both carry Islamic identities, the taste of Islam offered by Jokowi-Ma'ruf differs in the four regions. Ma'ruf Amin comes from the NU organization, which has a culture different from West Java, Aceh, and West Sumatra, which did not receive dominant NU influence. The concept and jargon of Islam Nusantara, which has experienced controversy among several Islamic mass organizations outside NU, has increasingly distanced support.

Post-2014 presidential election and 2019 presidential election, verbal violence in the form of radical stigma occurred against several employees of the Corruption Eradication

Commission (KPK). The issue of the identity of “Taliban Police” and “Indian Police” as an accusation that reflects divisions between investigators has been developing since 2009. The Indian Police refers to KPK investigators from the Police, while the Taliban Police refers to Novel Baswedan’s group of investigators in Wadah. KPK employee. The term Taliban is a description of verbal violence directed at radicalization among some KPK investigators. The involvement of BNPT and BIN in selecting KPK leaders in May 2019 strongly indicates the promotion of radical perceptions within the KPK.

Verbal violence against some investigators, such as “Taliban police,” who were perceived as radicals, created a division in support among society. The stigma of radical KPK investigators with the characteristics of skinny pants and beards is part of a weakening scenario for the delegitimization of the KPK. The radical stigma against KPK employees after the 2019 presidential election is at least an indicator of efforts to weaken one of the pillars of democracy, especially in eradicating criminal acts of corruption. The TWK results, which target several employees with integrity and reputation, have given rise to various speculations, such as weakening political opponents ahead of the 2024 presidential election.

Political violence is at least the legacy of every ruler. At the beginning of the Jokowi-Ma’ruf administration, some groups potentially started this practice with the issuance of a Joint Decree (SKB) concerning Handling radicalism in the Context of Strengthening National Insight in the State Civil Apparatus. The SKB was signed by 6 Ministers and 5 heads of state institutions in November 2019. Each of them is the Minister for Empowerment of State Apparatus and Bureaucratic Reform (Menpan RB), Minister of Home Affairs (Mendagri), Minister of Law and Human Rights (Menkumham), Minister of Religion, Minister of Education and Culture (Mendikbud), Minister of Communication and Information (Kominfo), Head of BIN, Head of BNPT, Head of BKN, Head of BPIP, and Chair of the ASN Commission.

Some civil circles consider the ratification of the SKB on ASN Radicalism to limit freedom of expression and become an instrument of political control over ASN. The SKB on ASN Radicalism regulates 11 violations that have the potential for multiple interpretations according to the holder of power. Hate speech against Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, and the Republic of Indonesia, for example, adds to the overlap in regulations. Hate speech is regulated by the Criminal Code, the ITE Law, and the Elimination of Discrimination Law, so the legal mechanism is clear. The SKB on ASN Radicalism is considered to have the potential to be used to silence ASN’s resistance to bad government practices, in line with the increasing cases of hate speech in Indonesia (Wiharyani et al., 2023).

Political violence occurred, which some parties believe was the result of a series of intelligence operations. This is what happened to the Habib Rizieq Shihab (HRS) group or Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), exponents of Action 212, as well as the moral movement group Action Coalition to Save Indonesia (WE). Political operations have been ongoing, at least as seen through the instrumentation of criminal law against some FPI activists, 212 activists, and KAMI activists since the defeat of the investor group’s political proxy war in the 2017 DKI Jakarta Regional Election. For example, the silencing of KAMI activists was carried out by arresting Syahganda Nainggolan, Jumbuh Hidayat, and Anton Permana, including some KAMI activists in several regions.

Mainstreaming Peace Building: NU and Shi'i

Identity can be used to create community solidity if it is constructed appropriately (Magill et al., 2024). The weakness in society is that contestation over diversity is considered to require eliminating or eliminating the role of other people. In this position, elaborating sensitivity to differences, often called sociocultural abilities, becomes very important. Sociocultural aspects help people know their role in society, recognize the characteristics of society, and become aware of living together in society under any conditions. It is the initial essence of Pancasila, which forms the identity of the Indonesian nation.

Sociocultural competence can be developed in various ways. First, religious moderation. This development is carried out by providing tolerant religious substance. Inter-religious conflict and violence in the name of religion tend to be influenced by the model of understanding religion that is always confronted. Religion is often used as a justification for competition or threats to the existence of other religions. Contestation in moderation must be driven by contestation of goodness. Each religious community must develop themselves and their community to the best capacity, including education, economics, health, culture, and politics. If internal awareness about religious immunity has been formed, it will be easy to carry out joint work across religions.

The doctrine of tension between sects in Islam, for example, is often influenced by the argument that Muslims are divided into 73 groups. All groups go to hell except one group, namely *Ahlussunnah wal Jama'ah*. The proposition known as the *iftiroq* or *firqoh* hadith is a hadith originating from Abu Hurairah and narrated through Abu Dawud, Tarmidhi, Ibnu Majah, Ibnu Hiban, and Hakim (Arif, 2022). The existence of this doctrine of division has the potential to make a group feel self-righteous by placing other groups in error.

Differences in ideological interpretation of religious propositions, accompanied by foreign cultural infiltration, often become a commodity for clashes between internal-religious and external-religious groups. This reality is important to find a peaceful formulation with awareness of the values of moderation amid national and state relations. The inclusiveness of society in recognizing each other's identities is an awareness that must be continuously built. The meeting point between nationality and Islam can be seen in the principles that must be upheld, namely the demand for community unity (*al-ummah*), protection of community rights (*al-adalah*), the principle of deliberation (*al-syura*), and equality of treatment (*al-musawah*).

Table of Moderation Values for the Sunni-Shi'i Muslim Community in Jepara

No	Value Moderation	Doctrine	Mental Models
1	Humanity and Benefit	QS. Al-Maidah: 32	Whoever kills one life is like killing all humanity. Whoever gives life to one life is like protecting the life of all humanity.
2	Justice and Balance	QS. Al-Baqarah: 143	God made humans essentially a just or moderate community
3	Nationality	QS. Al Hujurat: 13	God created humans from male and female elements, nations, and tribes
4	Tolerance	QS. Al Kafirun: 6	Every religious follower has their truth about their religion
5	Anti-violence	QS. Al Baqarah: 256	There is no coercion in religion
6	Obey the Constitution	QS. An Nisa: 59	Obey Allah, obey the Messenger, and obey the leader
7	Respect for Local Wisdom	QS. Al Jasiyah: 16-18	The concept of <i>syar'un man qoblana</i> , or adaptation of the traditions of previous people, giving rise to the legal rules of <i>'urf</i>

Awareness regarding the value of moderation within the NU Muslim community and Jepara Shi'i community is developed through educational channels. The value of religious moderation is very effective in being developed through collaborative work between communities across ethnic, cultural, spiritual, and social backgrounds (Wardi et al., 2023). Human values are an important foundation because of the awareness that Sunni NU and Shi'i followers in Jepara still have blood kinship. This fraternal relationship can be seen between husband and wife who are mixed NU-Syi'ah, uncle and nephew, and grandfather and grandson. The pattern of social relations tends to melt so that the principle developed is openness to mutually safeguard the public interest (Amaliyah, 2015). The absence of suspicion between people in Jepara's NU and Shi'i communities is greatly influenced by the relationship between descendants in the same family bloodline.

The open attitude of the Muslim community in Jepara has influenced the Shi'i community to no longer worship in secret (*taqiyyah*). The relationship between religious practices gave rise to a new identity in the form of Shi'ism, the Syafi'i school of thought. The two Muslim communities, NU and Shi'a, often hold activities together, including joint recitations, congregational prayers, and honoring ancestors through the same haul on Muharram 1 for Sheikh Muhammad Arif Al-Adny, who comes from Yemen. The mosque, which is Mbah Arif's legacy, is at least a cement for harmony because the Shi'i community is aware of not calling its place of worship a mosque but simply a prayer room or *langgar* (small mosque in Java).

The spirit of nationalism and nationhood as fellow Indonesian citizens is the foundation for broader harmony between Jepara's NU and Shi'i Muslim communities. The appearance of the national concept at least imitates the steps the Prophet Muhammad took to pay attention to the interests of community unity (*al-ummah al-wahidah*) in Medina. Since its development, the Muslim community in Indonesia has recognized the

meaning of brotherhood, not just brothers based on religion (*ukhuwah Islamiyah*), but also the brotherhood of compatriots (*ukhuwah wathaniyah*) and the brotherhood of fellow human beings (*ukhuwah basyariyah*). The founders of the nation formulated this with the ties of Pancasila.

Many Indonesian Muslim communities do not view Pancasila as a principle of the Islamic religion. In the epistemology of Islamic law (*ushul fiqih*), Pancasila is the same as *al-kulliyat al-khams*, namely the basic principles of enforcing Islamic law. The five principles of Islamic law are the protection of religion (*hifzh din*), protection of the soul (*hifzh al-nafs*), protection of descendants (*hifzh al-nasl*), protection of reason (*hifzh al'aql*), protection of property (*hifzh mal*).

Al-kulliyat al-khams in the Indonesian context is reflected in the formulation of Pancasila. The basic principles of the state, which are original cultural products of the Indonesian nation, already provide religious protection for the first principle. The second principle is the protection of the soul and aspects of humanity. The third principle is the protection of descendants as a form of citizenship rights. Protection of reason and freedom of association come together in the fourth principle. Meanwhile, the protection of assets and access to economic resources is reflected in the fifth principle.

Pancasila is the foundation of norms for the laws that apply in Indonesia. This has implications for the implementation and application of Islamic law, which must not be contrary to the values of Pancasila, namely the values of divinity, humanity, unity, deliberation, and justice. Islamic law is a source of national law that interacts with other religions. Pancasila, as a national school of thought, is placed to strengthen Islam in the archipelago and develop Indonesian civilization and a peaceful world civilization.

Second, developing awareness of defending the country. The identity contestation that is taking place in several regions tends to be influenced by a collective consciousness that is not yet a unified national entity. Ethnicity and religious identity will become part of endless national problems if awareness as a nation is not unified. A nation is a combination of many entities and identities bound by an image of ideals. Developing an understanding of defending the country can be done through joint work based on local wisdom, integration of local culture in daily activities, unification of multiple identities to accept differences, and development of citizenship education based on local knowledge (Sulianti et al., 2019).

Human actions are social practices that are repeated and patterned across time and space. The existence of a space and time span can influence a person's formation as a social actor who reflects social practices in certain structures or rules. The structure or arrangement that a person carries out as an agent can impact the emergence of identity negotiations. In this position, the development of sociocultural abilities can at least minimize identity stigmatization, leading to discrimination. The relationship between individuals and external factors as a regulatory structure gives rise to individual and collectivity-based identities. Religious intolerance or fear of spreading the ideology of certain religious sects and the mission of spreading certain religions is often the main factor (Dauda, 2020).

A person can take advantage of diversity in society to create new identities and reproduce identities. Individuals are no longer themselves but adopt various types of

personalities based on existing structures (Kaloeti & Ardhiani, 2020). In such a position, ideological immunity and the influence of external factors outside oneself play a large role in identity construction. The individual negotiations carried out are closely related to social roles in organizational structures in society, as well as labeling carried out by other parties. The NU Muslim community and the Shi'i community in Jepara have carried out elaborations on building harmonious relations after being able to construct mental models of suspicion and hatred on sectarian grounds.

The program to stem the flow of sectarianism in the context of a religious approach is to reconstruct religious understanding. Such steps can be taken by eliminating radical knowledge of the verses of the Qur'an and hadith, especially regarding the concept of jihad and war against infidels. Such steps do not mean giving birth to a new understanding of Islam but straightening and restoring the knowledge of Islam as a religion of peace. The basic spirit of the Qur'an is the principles of morality that uphold human values, not law, so it is very important to study the Qur'an in terms of its ideas and socio-historical background in the form of *asbabun nuzul* and *asbabul wurud*.

Religion as an approach in programs to stem the flow of violent extremism means explaining the concepts of *jihad*, *dar al-harb*, *kafir*, apostate, and *taghut*. The meaning of this concept is to re-explain religious doctrine with a peaceful perspective to overcome the spread of religious radicalism indoctrination in society. It is necessary to map programs that must be directed at core groups, militants, and supporters while sympathizers and the general public with counter-radicalization strategies.

An example of the religious approach implemented by the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) is by presenting a cleric from Jordan named Shaikh Ali Hasan Al Halabi, as well as clerics from Egypt named Syaikh Hisyam al-Najjar and Syaikh Najib Ibrahim. Each is a former Jema'ah Islamyah figure from Egypt in the 1970s and 1980s. The fatwas of these two figures are often used as a basis for terrorists to act, so there needs to be a re-explanation following the latest legal opinion. Bringing in figures who were former perpetrators of acts of terrorism or violence in the name of religion is targeted to be able to straighten out and explain the things that trigger various acts of terrorism, even though it also brings many attacks from organizations that have characteristics of radical thought and movements.

Shaykh Ali Hasan Al-Halabi's arrival in Indonesia was intended to be able to dialogue with terrorism defendants and prisoners in prisons as well as discussions with the community outside prisons. The aim of reconstructing this understanding was immediately responded to by organizations supporting radical thought with a counter-narrative campaign through reporting on some websites and social media that aimed to support radicalism. The strategy of presenting figures who have been part of radical groups is urgently implemented because Indonesian religious figures for terrorist networks are considered representatives of the *Taghut* government and, therefore, fall into the category of infidels and are disabled.

As in QS, there are 3 (three) problems with verses that are often used to fight or suspect non-Islamic groups. Al-Baqarah: 120. First, there is the emergence of a perception that people outside Islam, especially Christians and Jews, are eternal enemies, which is confirmed by several verses that criticize the behavior of Jews and Christians towards

the Prophet Muhammad and his followers. Second, hostile relations were enforced for an indefinite period to view all Jews and Christians as enemies. Third, there is a loss of attention to other verses that call for aspects of tolerance so that the Al-Qur'an, which consists of thousands of verses, seems to be generalized in certain verses only.

The guidance given regarding the explanation of verses regarding the relationship between Islam and non-Islam is to make people aware that understanding verses requires first understanding the historical background to the revelation of verses in QS. Al Baqarah: 120, Imam al-Wahidi explains that one day, Jews and Christians proposed a ceasefire to the Messenger of Allah. When the Messenger of Allah almost accepted a truce, Allah reminded him through this verse that Jews and Christians would never be willing to follow a ceasefire or peace agreement with Islam. The second background relates to the request of Jews and Christians to continue to face the Qibla towards the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

The historical context in coloring the birth of religious texts certainly has different nuances when connected in cooperation in education, economics, politics, culture, and others. This is because the verse relates to a ceasefire and changing the direction of the Qibla. Hostility towards Jews and Christians that is generalized to all fields will be contrary to the verse, which states the importance of understanding ethnic, national, and religious diversity.

The understanding underlying religious sectarian movements is the obligation to uphold God's law, which has been carried out by Wahhabism sponsored by Saudi Arabia by institutionalizing religious knowledge with the postulates of the QS. Al-Maidah: 44. As a result, God's law is considered a law that originates from Islam alone by eliminating other religions. Islamic law has also experienced narrowing down as law handed down to certain groups, for example, Islamic law, which Sunni clerics codified, is not considered God's law by Shi'i. This fact can be seen from what was practiced by the Khawarij by declaring Ali bin Abu Tholib and Muawiyah as infidels.

Islam has its roots in the word *salam*, which means peace. The concept of peace in Islam has 3 (three) main components: peace that emerges from within humans, peace in social relations, and peace in facing conflict. The development of exclusive Islamic groups, which often use violence as a tool to achieve their political goals, is influenced by literal and historical interpretations of the al-Qur'an. Literal interpretation means that understanding the al-Qur'an does not pay attention to history or people's lives when a verse of the al-Qur'an is revealed. Several verses are often quoted to justify symbolic appearances and actions to differentiate between Muslims and non-Muslims, thus manifesting as intolerant actions towards non-Muslims, as in the QS al-Maidah verse 51.

Conclusion

The democracy that has been running in Indonesia since the beginning of independence until now is still characterized by struggles between national and religious groups. Re-strengthening national Islam in supporting the development of democracy in Indonesia, of course, cannot be separated from the Indonesian Islamic moderation paradigm. Islam is synergized through the state foundation of Pancasila to embrace all components of the nation. The success of the formulation of Pancasila manifested

the peaceful meeting between nationalism and religion in Indonesia. The character of diversity has received a good position of appreciation to synergize Islamic teachings with the customs or local wisdom of the people of the archipelago. This forms a social system that maps the national identity itself. The formulation of Islam and the former state became the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

The Republic of Indonesia is a country that bases its community's interaction patterns on being open and friendly to the cultural environment. Therefore, no matter how hard the political contestation takes place in Indonesia, in the end, the community can synergize with each other again as a cultural wisdom of the Indonesian nation, such as the relationship between NU and the Shi'i in Jepara. In another position, identity politics or the commodification of identity in politics in Indonesia is different from what occurs in other regions of the world. Identity in national politics is political differentiation that prioritizes a middle path or moderation (*tawasuth*), not to eliminate opposing parties. As a Darussalam or peaceful country, the style of religion in Indonesia gave birth to the establishment of Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia. The collaboration between Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia animates the characteristics of a peaceful Indonesian nation that fosters diversity and can work together in diversity.

The main foundation that supports the success of identifying the potential for radicalism in transnational movements in countering the threat of democratization by strengthening identity politics is combining a religious approach with a national approach through cross-sectoral cooperation. Collaborative relationships must be supported by structural strength and Islamic authority in any country. The contribution of basic state acceptance in the form of Pancasila by Indonesian ulama shows that Indonesia has succeeded in uniting Islam and democracy in the state dimension so that no clashes occur. The values of humanity, justice, nationality, obeying the constitution, and respect for local wisdom in society must be a campaign to cultivate community immunity against extremism.

Identity can be used to create community solidity if it is constructed appropriately. The weakness in society is that contestation over diversity is considered to require eliminating or eliminating the role of other people. In this position, elaborating sensitivity to differences, often called sociocultural abilities, becomes very important. Sociocultural aspects help people know their role in society, recognize the characteristics of society, and become aware of living together in society under any conditions. This is the initial essence of Pancasila, which forms the identity of the Indonesian nation and can provide immunity from the infiltration of violent extremist ideologies.

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