Glocalization of Religious Extremism and Terrorism in Indonesia

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Abstract
This article seeks to critically reinterpret the international and domestic factors that inspire terrorism in Indonesia. The rise of religious interpretation based political extremism culminating in violent terrorism is a serious threat confronting Indonesia in the 21st Century. The ostensibly multifarious and heterogenous impetus behind the origin of the resort to terrorism notwithstanding, the prevalent reductionist obscurantism surrounding the complexities underlying political violence justified through a religious referential, warrant academic re-interrogation, for deciphering the authenticity of the extant Western-dominated hypothetical paradigms. Drawing from the dominant theoretical explications and discourses accounting for the phenomenon of the proliferation of intermestic terrorism, the Article adopts a structural realist framework for interrogating the inductive effects of International politics on domestic terrorism in Indonesia. Extremism and terrorism can not only be associated with fundamental problems of interpretation of religious teachings and poverty, but can also be related to issues of intermestic politics and American interventionist policies.

Keywords
Extremism, Intermestic politics, Religion, Terrorism,

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Pendahuluan
Indonesia, an archipelagic State with abundant natural resources, and a rapidly developing economy is the regional hegemon of South East Asia. Though its geostrategic location and well-equipped armed forces obviate most external security threats to the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of the Republic, Indonesia has grappled with internal strife, secessionism and more recently a heinously sanguineous spate of terrorism inspired by religious extremism which hinders its development and impedes the achievement of its rightful place in the comity of nations. Recent
scholarship about religious extremism and terrorism in Indonesia, a majority of which is predominantly Eurocentric in orientation, ascribes the rise of extremism and consequent terrorism to endemic ethnoreligious differences (Vatikiotis, 1997), or the reconfiguration of internal politics of Indonesia, especially in the post-Suharto Reformasi era of Indonesia, towards political opportunism, rampant corruption, appeasement of religious extremists, and ethnic/religious discrimination against sections of its citizens (Greg & Hooker, 2006).

Other scholars present a rather reductionist socioeconomic causation for the rise of religious extremism as an overt manifestation of masked economic contestation (Joseph & Tim, 2002) delineated by, and coalescing around, identities defined by religion, which they presume to be reflective of the widening inherent social cleavages in Indonesian society (Duncan, 2005). These interpretations while deserving credit for their scholarly merit and apparent explanatory value, largely gloss over the influence that global political dynamics and international politics exert over domestic developments in developing post-colonial States in general, and Indonesia in particular.

This article seeks to locate the intermestic nature of the rise of religious extremism and terrorism in Indonesia. As a theoretical meta-study, the article does not propose any research question, but only identifies an issue for contextual meta review. The explanation for the approach is clearly mentioned as a contextualized meta study. This article seeks to decipher the rise of religious fundamentalism, religious extremism, and terrorism in Indonesia from the perspective of these being intermestic responses to global political phenomena.

Religion has emerged as an important rallying point in intermestic politics, due to its popular appeal, and consequently, political mobilization for otherwise secular causes is increasingly being mediated through appeal to religious values, across the World. Many political movements, for secessionism, or political hegemony have resorted to the mobilization of religious identity in Indonesian politics also. For example, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka has in the past resorted to secessionist appeals based on protestant Christian religious identity (Bell, Feith & Hatley, 1986), the FALINTIL of East Timor succeeded in part because of its mobilization based on Catholic religious distinctiveness of the region (Conboy, 2003), while the secessionist Geurakan Acèh Meurdèka movement in North Sumatra was motivated by the political ideology of Islamism (Miller, 2008).

However, the international developments and elite co-option in US strategic doctrine, combined with a pan-Islamic sense of identity resulting in psychological fraternization with Muslims in other States and deep distrust of the neo-Imperialist American policies against Islamic nations in general, and in favour of Israel against Palestine in particular, also play a pivotal role in mobilising antagonism and nurturing terrorism as an asymmetric conflictual reaction. The role of powerful vested interests in certain middle eastern States in fomenting anti-US sentiments and financing Islamism in Indonesia and propagating the political ideology of Islamism through the guise of religious training is also an area that warrants scholarly engagement.

Recent Western scholarship on the evolving relationship between the State and Religion in the twenty-first century largely juxtaposes the two as mutually exclusive and calls for the subjugation of “fundamentalist” religious faith to State control through legislation and policy (Hedges, 2009). Religious faith is increasingly being projected as incompatible with democratization (Lipset & Rokkan, 1968) and as a source of terrorism and political destabilization (Harris, 2005). This overt political antipathy towards religion is driven by paranoia over religious extremism and the possibility of its mutation into political terrorism, especially in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terror attacks (henceforth 9/11) in the United States of America (henceforth, US).

This approach conflates religion with religious extremism inspired terrorism and fails to differentiate between religious faith as the most influential socio-psychological institution in human history (Shermer, 2003) and fails to acknowledge that terrorism and political violence can arise from multifarious causes of which religious extremism is just one. The rise of religious piety,
fundamentalism, extremism (and religious conflict) in societies of developing States of South and South East Asia is condescendingly attributed by some scholars to local socio-political identity-centric factors (Hefner, 2010), overlooking the legacy of discordant colonial policies which were engineered to be socially divisive. Similarly, the rise of religious fundamentalism (as opposed to religious extremism), as a coping mechanism by which the different religious communities seek the preservation of their unique identities, traditions, and social structural norms, against the homogenizing dilution posed by pervasive modernity and globalization, though acknowledged in sociology (Rutheven, 2007), is inadequately addressed in International Politics. This article seeks to decipher the rise of religious fundamentalism, religious extremism, and terrorism in Indonesia from the perspective of these being intermestic responses to Global political phenomena.

Methods

This theoretical review article, based exclusively on secondary sources adopts the qualitative analytical methodology for re-interrogation of the historical and contemporary intermestic factors responsible for the rise of religious extremism and terrorism in Indonesia (Kurniawati, 2017). Drawing from the corpus of scholarly literature on the subject, a contextualized meta-study to reinterpret the causal drivers of political violence in Indonesia is attempted. The study adopts a structural realist, post-colonial interpretative approach to draw its inferences about the inductive effects of International Politics on domestic Indonesian political developments culminating in the ubiquity of terrorism. The article is limited to the analysis of the topic from the international relations paradigm and based on prior literature, as no primary data has been collected or analyzed. This article analyzes only the ideological and systemic causes of terrorism. It is more focused on the terrorism associated with the political ideology of Islamism and geographically confined to the study of Indonesia only.

Result and Discussion

Contrary to expectations, religion indubitably continues to be a potent political mobilizing factor in pluri-religious post-colonial democracies. Notwithstanding the proliferation of science and education in society, the resurgence of religious faith in all aspects of life including politics is explicated by scholars who postulate religion as a social institution that shapes a world view of the how principles and ethics for life, (personally of the individual, socially of the society and politically of the State), ought to be organized (Shermer, 2003). Despite the rise of atheism and agnosticism in modern society, the dominance of communism in several regions, and the Constitutional and legal enshrinement of the separation of religion from governance in most pluri-religious post-colonial States (Greenawalt, 2005), religious faith continues to be resurgent and increase in political relevance as an identity marker of the community, and more so as a definitive and captive vote bank relevant to electoral contestation, across democracies in the world (Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2009). Not only is religion thriving as a locus of political identity, but revivalist religious fundamentalism and violent religious militancy are also emerging as political instruments for enforcing counter-narratives and political alternatives to the sweeping globalizing discourses of secularization, and hegemonic acculturation (Almond, Appleby & Sivan, 2003).

While the progression from political mobilization based on religious identity, religious fundamentalism to religious extremism, and ultimately in some cases, to terrorism, is undoubtedly nurtured by national politics and manifested locally within the national political framework, the origin of political ideologies instrumentalizing religion, and operationalizing the achievement of their political objectives through violence inspired and legitimated through religious extremism, is a sociopolitical local reaction, to Globalization (Khondker, 2004). This phenomenon of reactionary politics in national, subnational, and local levels within States, inspired and motivated by developments in supranational and global politics has been called “glocalization” of issues (Robertson, 2012). Glocalization, which seeks articulation or disarticulation of domestic politics
with international political developments and discourses, is instantized through “intermestic” politics which seeks to reconfigure public policies affecting citizens within the State by influencing conducive developments in domestic politics, in response to anticipated effects of international politics (Kurniawati et al., 2017). Religion has emerged as an important rallying point in intermestic politics, due to its popular appeal, and consequently, political mobilization for otherwise secular causes is increasingly being mediated through appeal to religious values, across the World. Many political movements, for secessionism, or political hegemony have resorted to the mobilization of religious identity in Indonesian politics also. For example, the Organisasi Papua Merdeka has in the past resorted to secessionist appeals based on protestant Christian religious identity (Bell, Feith & Hatley, 1986), the FALINTIL of East Timor succeeded in part because of its mobilization based on Catholic religious distinctiveness of the region (Conboy, 2003), while the secessionist Gerakan Aceh Merdeka movement in North Sumatra was motivated by the political ideology of Islamism (Miller, 2008).

This article, for focus, only discusses the religious extremism and terrorism associated with the political ideology of Islamism in Indonesia. The political ideology of Islamism seeks to regulate, regiment, and define, according to its interests, the teachings, dogma, and parameters of the universal faith of Islam, largely through anachronistic social and political interpretations which promote a narrow homogenizing preconceived ideology developed largely in the twentieth century (Daniel, 2003). The relatively modern political ideology of Islamism, which is often associated with exclusion, and political violence, is distinct from the universal, egalitarian, and peaceful tenets of the faith of Islam to such an extent that scholars assert that Islamism as not only incompatible with, but also so contradictory to, the egalitarian and inclusive and peaceful tenets of the faith of Islam to such an extent that it is anti-Islam (Noorani, 2002). Islamism uses terms drawn from the Islamic faith, seeks to appropriate and reinvent traditional Islamic religious concepts such as Jihad and Caliphate, while instrumentalizing the support and uncritical fervour of Muslim society for the achievement of its political objectives (Ayoob, 2015). Diverging from the chronological, geographical, and cultural universalism of the Islamic faith, the political ideology of Islamism seeks to limit and give it an orientation which is culturally Arab-centric and anti-Occidental, thereby feeding similar parochial fundamentalist ideologies in the West, due to which even eminent Western Scholars, overlooking composite and peaceful pluri-religious cultures, presage a conflictual relation between what they envision as (authoritarian and religious) Islamic Civilizational values and (human rights-respecting and pro-democracy) Western Christian Civilization that has speciously been characterized as a global inevitable “Clash of Civilizations” (Huntington, 1993). While prejudiced and inaccurate, these western theories at least acknowledge the intermestic interaction of global politics and religion.

While micro-level domestic political factors provide fertile ground for localised growth of religious extremism and terrorism, the rise of non-state terrorism, especially after the end of the Cold War, has its macro-level roots in global developments (Cronin, 2013). The Cold War between the US Capitalism and USSR Communism had for more than forty years of the twentieth century engaged the superpowers in a proxy war wherein Islam and Islamists in other “pivotal States” were nurtured, equipped with weapons, and trained for war to be used as pawns against the ideological adversary by both the superpowers and their allies. The US neo-Imperialist strategic policy to counteract the spread of communism, included propping to power the pliant elites in the pivotal States, use of USAID, economic and military support in the pivotal States without any consideration for democratic norms or human rights. To subserve the preeminent foreign policy goal of containment of the communist ideology, the US designed, supported, and facilitated large scale indoctrination of youth into religious extremism in the pivotal States as gun fodder fighters, through a narrative, which as a strategic psychological tool, pitched an entire generation of impoverished radicalised youth against the “atheist” communist regime (Crenshaw, 1998).
With the fall of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the elites and the radical religious extremists assiduously cultivated by the US in the pivotal States were summarily abandoned. This engendered civil war in countries like Afghanistan, and created political instability and motivated coups in countries like Pakistan, Syria, Somalia, and Sudan (Mamdani, 2004). The political ascendancy of radical Islamism in these impoverished States was also contemporaneous with the rise of Zionist politics and the resurgence of the Republican Party in the US. The domestic political imperatives of appeasing the traditional Zionist “Bible Belt Christians” in Southern US who comprised the largest support base of the Republican Party, in turn, influenced the US foreign policy generally and related to Israel-Palestine particularly.

The US support for Israel and Israeli militarism against Palestinians (most of whom were Muslims) alienated and antagonised the radicalised Islamic religious extremists, against American ideologies and values as they felt that the US was supporting the genocide of their fellow Muslims (Simons, 2015). The jingoist rhetoric of Israeli politicians further entrenched these notions. While terrorism inspired by Islamism was initially local and confined within the pivotal States, and directed against the co-opted elite allies of US, soon internal strife and rivalry within the radical Islamists prompted ever-increasing stakes to be articulated within Islamism, and as a response to US global dominance the globalisation of “jihad” emerged (Gerges, 2005). This elevated the political goals of Islamism beyond the pivotal States and sought to network the political ideology of Islam transnationally to strike at those perceived to be enemies of Islam beyond national borders (Zimmerman, 2004). The most prominent target of this globalised terror was the US, exemplified by the 9/11 terrorist attack which exposed the shocking vulnerability of even the World’s sole superpower to asymmetric warfare and suicide terrorism (Crenshaw et al., 1998).

This terror attack prompted the US-led Islamophobic demonisation of the entire Islamic faith and even peaceful moderate Muslims as terrorists in Western literature (Schwartz, 2002), despite the very low levels of support for terrorism and Islamism, estimated at one individual in every five million Muslims (Pape, 2003), even within the Islamic States. It also elicited a militarist response from the US in the form of a declaration of the “War on Terror”, a euphemism for military interventionism in Afghanistan and other Islamic States (Hoffman, 2004) under the garb of restoration of democracy and preventing transnational terror attacks. These interventions were sought to be legitimised through western academic metanarratives designed to validate military invasions and occupation of Sovereign States by the US, although the linkage between the democratisation and terrorism is empirically tenuous and disputed (Li, 2005; Gause, 2005; Eubank & Leonard, 1994). It would be pertinent to note here that the US has a dubious history of not only supporting undemocratic regimes and dictatorships but also engineering anti-democratic interventions and engineering coups in other States when it suits its interests (Schmid, 1993).

The prevalent discourse in Islamism which prompts reactionary mobilisation against the West and its local allies, in otherwise moderate and tolerant Islamic societies, succeeds as it pitches American neo-Imperialism discourse of “democratisation, secularism and human rights” as an excuse for interventionism against, and suppression of Islamic faith, either directly or through co-opted political elites in power (Slackman, 2006). However, it would be reductionist and fallacious to adopt an Islamist-democratic dichotomy when discussing Islam and politics in the context of Indonesia where Islamic Conservatism does not necessarily imply the rejection of democratic or even the secular ideals of the State (Telik, Hadiz & Nakanishi, 2014). It is necessary to stress here the difference between pacific Islamic conservatism and Islamism.

Pacific Islamic conservatism seeks the peaceful voluntary inductive application of universal principles of Islam as a value ethic of Indonesian politics and is inclusive of other religious minorities and heterodox Islamic sects. Contrary to this, the violent political ideology of Islamism seeks to impose its version of Islam, if necessary with violence even against Muslims who disagree, is against heterodoxy and other faiths, and ultimately rejects democracy in favour of an “Islamic State of Indonesiа”. Islamism is supportive of and aspires to achieve the “Islamic State
of Indonesia”, which would then be under the suzerainty of the Global Islamic Caliphate (whose geographical and political locus would invariably be located outside Indonesia). This external locus, beyond national borders of the State, related to religious extremism linked terrorism in Indonesia after the year 2000, is in some ways an effort at globalising Islamism and drawing upon International support from allies and patrons of the ideology in other States, and as a response mirrors the strategy of the US and its domestic allies in Indonesia.

Indonesia, because of its immense potential economic prowess, geostrategic location, proximity to the South China Sea, and hegemonic dominance of South East Asia, ranks high in the US strategic doctrine. Indonesia is considered a pivotal State and an ally of the US in the “War against Terror” in American Foreign Policy (Chase, Hill & Kenned, 1999). Indonesia has moved closer to the US after the secession of East Timor as it struggled with secessionist political violence in Papua and resurgent Islamism in Aceh (Haseman & Lachica, 2005). The US realises the crucial importance of Indonesia as an invaluable ally which can facilitate staging/ logistic in case of any conflict in the politically volatile South China Sea region. It has therefore increasingly cultivated strategic, economic, and political relations with Indonesia, after 2001. While the strategic alliance between Indonesia and the US in the Reformasi era has influenced the domestic Indonesian policy against Terrorism, Islamism has also derived its ideological base and substantial international support, (finance and training) from certain other States in the Middle East (Denmark, Sukma & Parthemore, 2010). There is evidence that Indonesian extremists received training, support and funds from Islamist regimes such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Fair & Shepherd, 2006), and recently some Indonesian extremists have also reportedly fought alongside the Daesh in Syria. The financial, material, and logistical support of radical Islamists of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, to radical extremists and terrorists across the world is well noted (Gold, 2003).

The rise of Islamism and the process of internestic seeding of religious extremism motivated terror in Indonesia, especially after 9/11 is closely linked with its history and the political structure of the State. To fully comprehend the process of how Internationally funded Islamism, which seeks to ultimately subjugate the Sovereign Republic of Indonesia to an external Global Islamic Caliphate, gets glocalized and draws support in Indonesian politics, the rise of religious extremism and terrorism in Indonesia must be analysed from the historical post-Colonial perspective. The colonial history of Indonesia was fraught with rampant economic and political subjugation of the native population of the archipelago, by the Dutch colonisers along with the systematic exacerbation of the latent religious, and ethnic divisions within the society of the Dutch East Indies. These policies of the colonial Dutch Government also sought to accentuate differences within Indonesian society to prevent the possibility of the consolidation of a nationalist pan-Indonesia movement which could threaten the control of the European coloniser Empire. Such divisive policies were distinctively used to perpetuate colonialism by European Imperial colonising powers (Said, 1978). Indonesia, a religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and culturally diverse State achieved its Independence from the Dutch in 1945. The demography of the Republic of Indonesia comprises of a population which consists of an overwhelming percentage of adherents of Islam. However, a testament to the inclusivity of the Islamic faith is the Indonesian State, which despite having the highest number of adherents of Islam in the World, has chosen not to be an Islamic State, and is pluri-religious (Annual report on Religious Life in Indonesia 2013, 2013). Indonesia enshrines tolerance, religious and ethnic, as a cornerstone of its supreme law, the Constitution of Indonesia, 1945 which seeks to promote fraternity and preserve its diversity (Mydans, 2007).

The Constitution envisions Indonesia as a Republic with Rule of Law and is the foundation of the nationalism, aspirational conscience, and structural and institutional framework of the State (Farida, 2005). All citizens of Indonesia irrespective of their religious faith, ethnicity or gender are assured the right to equality of opportunity in access to the Offices of the State, and equality before the law, and political participation (Nasution & Buyung, 1992). The State is Constitutionally
prohibited from encroaching upon the Constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights of the citizens (Assyaukanie, 2009) and the federal structure of the Government (Djafar, 2010). The Constitution of Indonesia guarantees all basic rights and freedoms to all its citizens irrespective of their religion. This is further exemplified by the national ideology of Indonesia called *Pancasila* which is based upon and promotes equity and tolerance based on liberal rational consensus (Habermas, 1984), and the national motto “*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*” which emphasises Unity in Diversity. Thus, structurally Indonesia envisages a progressive democratic State with a very limited, if any, the role of religion, and provides a formal framework wherein equitable development without discrimination is presaged as a foundational value thereby theoretically obviating any propensities for secessionism from the Republic. However, even as the legal structural framework of egalitarian citizenship free from considerations of religious faith is affirmed as the foundation of the State in Indonesia (Asshiddiqi, 2006), fissiparous and radical religious extremism has recently emerged as the bane of Indonesian politics in the twenty-first century.

This is surprising since the faith of Islam, professed by most of the population, as historically practised in Indonesia “is peaceful, tolerant, modernistic, and democratic” (Sorm, 2004). Religious extremism has been largely absent in the history of Indonesia, as during colonial times the Dutch forcefully repressed any politicisation of Islam even while tolerating Islam as a religion (Suminto, 1985). In the Freedom Struggle of Indonesia from colonial rule secular nationalists and Civil Islamic Nationalists collaborated against the colonising Dutch Empire (Teik et al., 2014) and Platzdasch, 2009). The Civil Islamic Nationalists are the progressive and moderate followers of Islam (represented largely by the穆hammediyah and Nahdlatul Ulama in Indonesia) for whom tolerance of other minority faiths while personally adhering to Islamic monotheism, is the aim sought to be achieved through active philanthropic social work and the inductive inculcation of progressive tolerant, fraternizing Islamic values in Indonesian civil society through education, rather than participation in politics (Gellert, 2015). Religious leaders and social reformers like Ahmad Dahlan (Burhani, 2013) led the intellectual discourse on liberal pluralism and political modernism as an inherent characteristic of the personal faith of Muslims through the interpretation of Salafist Islamic faith (El Fadl, 2005), while politically being staunch inclusivist Indonesian nationalists whose fraternal vision included and embraced other religious minorities as equal citizens of the Republic (Federspiel, 2004).

After Independence, Sukarno’s Old Order was tolerant of piety and cultural Islam but promoted the national ideology of Pancasila as a counterweight to the rise of political Islamism (Federspiel et al., 2004). His successor Suharto’s New Order was more openly repressive against the politicisation of Islam and actively repressed Islamism (Amal, 1992) replacing it with a sanitized Statist interpretation of Islamic faith as a personal and cultural marker through the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Lapidos, 1991). When the New Order Regime collapsed in 1998, and the Indonesian polity was re-democratised in the Reformasi era, the restrictions on Islamism were largely removed (Rudnyckyj, 2010) and Islamic Conservatism became an acceptable ideology in Indonesian politics (Aspinall & Greg, 2003). The political orientation of the Islamic conservatives was introspective and the opposition of Islamic Conservatism was more directed against heterodox Islamic communities in Indonesia, such as the Ahmaddiyas, who while identifying as Muslim, departed from mainstream theological dogma (Ali-Fauzi, 2018), rather than against the other religious minorities.

The power vacuum created by the forced relinquishment of the discredited New Order political ideology and political appeasement of religious radicalism for myopic political gains by mainstream political parties created conditions for the rise of militant religious extremism in Indonesia (Feillard & Madinier, 2006) but it failed to find a political footing. While the Islamic conservatives expected to make substantial political gains, the political arena of electoral contestation in democracies with shifting priorities and affiliations of the electorate is a different ball game from the assured dogmatic matrix of religious institutionalism. Religiously conservative
ideologies can rarely gain political hegemony in democracies as they must contend against several different actors in a complex political environment (Noor, 2011). Negotiated compromise becomes imperative for political survival for all ideologies in democratic politics (Barratt, 2004). The struggle for political relevance leads to ideological moderation according to the inclusion moderation thesis (Buehler, 2013; Hwang, 2010; Permata & Kailani, 2010). These factors acted upon the Islamic conservatives in Indonesian politics, leading to factionalism.

From here on, two contradictory paths were taken by the two factions within the Islamic Conservatives. Those Islamic Conservatives who continued in electoral politics gradually diluted their extreme religious conservatism and, drawing upon the principles of universal brotherhood and tolerance inherent in the Islamic faith, promoted socio-religious tolerance, and gained a footing through winning seats especially in provincial and local elections in collaboration with secular parties (Cahyono, 1992; Lindsey, 2008). This influx of tolerant Islamic values into the political process has been accepted as a non-intrusive ethico-ideological reformation in Indonesian politics (Nasr, 2001). On the other hand, the more puritan Islamic conservatives who rejected “tolerance and compromise” and stressed on a more “traditional” interpretation of Islam, to distinguish themselves from the moderate Islamic conservatives, rapidly moved more towards religious extremism, and some of them adopted the radical political ideology of Islamism. The adherents of the political ideology of Islamism initially tried to gain political centre stage in Indonesia by putting up extremist candidates in the local elections. The complete routing of these religious extremist ideological candidates and the clear ambivalence of the civil society and political electorate of Indonesia towards the radical and extremist attempts of Islamism at politicisation in the general elections (Cochrane, 2014), reflected tolerance and inclusivity as a primary value of Indonesian society despite the intense political contestation and sometimes abrasive political rhetoric.

While Islamism failed to gain political power in mainline national and provincial politics, political opportunism and the tendency of political leaders to shirk criticism of Islamism as a violent ideology, led to the political ideology of Islamism gaining socio-religious influence in some regions and Islands of Indonesia (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004). Moreover, as scholars caution, the political debacle in the elections of the ideology of Islamism is not an indicator of the decline of its violent vehemence, or its inherent appeal and dangerous potential to radicalise certain sections of the citizens who may be prone to indoctrination into religious extremism (Tanuwidjaja, 2010) This also created an awareness among the radical Islamists and religious extremists that violent terrorism is more conducive to the achievement of their political objectives than participating in civil and issue-based, democratic elections (Platzdasch, 2009). For the realisation of these objectives, the process of converting adherents of tolerant Indonesian Islam, into a violent terrorist with a murderous hatred not only for adherents of other religions, but also against fellow moderate Muslims (Civil Islamists and Statist Islamists), is mediated through ideological indoctrination of the political ideology of Islamism which contems them as “fake” Muslims and “compromisers” unworthy of any compassion, tolerance, or empathy (Barton, 2005).

When analysed in the light of the above, the recent spate of suicide terrorist attacks (Bali and Jakarta), and political violence (Ambon, Maluku, and Aceh), motivated by the political ideology of Islamism and overt support to these by radicals within certain politically active groups (Assyaukanie et al., 2009) is the manifestation of the failure of radical Islamism to gain political salience in Indonesian elections. The contested political space and elitist nature of politics in Indonesia have been an inherent feature of its politics since Independence (Amenta, Caren, Chiarello & Suet, 2010), but the rise of violent terrorism associated with religious extremism and radical Islamism is more of a post 9/11 politico-social phenomenon. The radicalisation of certain sections of Indonesian polity and society can be attributable to a variety of factors including poverty, discrimination and religious indoctrination as established by scholars. However, the international developments and elite co-option in US strategic doctrine, combined with a pan-
Islamic sense of identity resulting in psychological fraternization with Muslims in other States and deep distrust of the neo-Imperialist American policies against Islamic nations in general, and in favour of Israel against Palestine in particular, also play a pivotal role in mobilising antagonism and nurturing terrorism as an asymmetric conflictual reaction. The role of powerful vested interests in certain middle eastern States in fomenting anti-US sentiments and financing Islamism in Indonesia and propagating the political ideology of Islamism through the guise of religious training is also an area that warrants scholarly engagement.

Conclusion

The fact that terrorist attacks and political violence linked with religious extremism which have become more ubiquitous in Indonesia and around the World, since the turn of the century, cannot be fully accounted for by the explanations from developments in domestic politics or economic discourses about poverty and under-development as the source of terrorism alone. There is a need to incorporate the analysis of glocalization factors which must be analysed further as the intermestic expression of global politics and American interventionalist policies.

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